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Preface
This study evaluates micro- and macroeconomic determinants for the
export performance of European suppliers to the markets of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By comparing marketing
strategies and the respective economic environment of suppliers from
Europe, Japan, and the US - the major exporters to the ASEAN region -
an attempt is made to trace the causes for the declining export market
shares of European companies and to suggest appropriate policy measures
to reverse this trend, which has continued since the early 1970s.
Large parts of the study focus on the role of foreign direct investment
in export expansion. To establish a reliable data bank on investment
patterns of multinational companies in ASEAN countries would not have
been possible without the selfless support of many staff members of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the research
unit of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the Institute of Developing
Economies and the Japan Economic Research Center (both in Tokyo), the
Ministry of Commerce in Thailand, the Indonesian Central Bank, and the
Commission of the European Communities. The authors also wish to
acknowledge the helpful suggestions and comments made on certain parts
of the present study by a large number of academic economists from the
ASEAN region and by researchers from the Australian National Uni-
versity, the Asian Development Bank, the East-West Center in Hawaii,
and the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. Last, but not
least, there have been numerous helpful discussions with colleagues in
the Institute.
The analysis presented in this volume is the outcome of a research
project which was carried out with the financial support of the VW
Foundation. The project was supervised by Ulrich Hiemenz, who also
prepared the final manuscript of this study together with Rolf J.
Langhammer. All the authors are staff members of the Kiel Institute of
World Economics except for Friedrich von Kirchbach, who joined the
research team as an outside expert.
The extensive empirical work documented in this volume was coordinated
by Martin Grol? with the efficient help of Angela Husfeld and Michaela
Rank. Mar got Miiller was responsible for the careful typing of the final
manuscript and Bernhard Klein and Sibylle Ruhnke meticulously edited
the text for publication.
Kiel, August 1987 The AuthorsI. Introduction
Since the early 1980s, there has been a continuing debate about the
competitiveness of West German and, more generally, European suppliers
of manufactured goods on world markets. Food for this debate has been
provided by declining shares of European manufactured exports in world
exports of manufactures which have been observed since the late 1970s.
Views differ with respect to the causes for this decline. Some analysts
argue [e.g. Giersch, 1985; Donges, Glismann, 1987] that delayed adjust-
ment to a changing international environment has preserved old in-
dustries and retarded the expansion of new industries thus weakening
the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector as a whole. Others such
as representatives of industrial associations regard high trade surpluses
of major European countries and the sustained top position of, e.g.,
West Germany in the hit list of the leading exporters of manufactured
goods as clear indications of the competitive strength of European in-
dustries. To them, declining European shares in world manufactured
exports are merely an arithmetical consequence of the emergence of new
participants in world export markets, in particular the Newly In-
dustrializing Countries (NICs).
The subsequent analysis contributes to this debate by assessing the
competitive position of European suppliers in the fast growing markets of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and by tracing major
determinants for the weak performance of European companies in those
markets. The focal point of this analysis is not the improvement of
bilateral trade relations. Success or failure in individual regional markets
do not necessarily depend on the international competitiveness of sup-
pliers from other countries, but may simply reflect differences in export
composition or natural advantages of geographical proximity. If, how-
ever, a weak performance in individual regional markets is not a singular
case but rather a symptom and can be identified as an early-warning
indicator for an impending general loss of international competitiveness -
as will be argued below - an analysis of export determinants in these
markets may provide valuable insight into the causes for eroding com-petitiveness and suggest appropriate measures at the firm and macro
level to reverse this trend.
The first step of the analysis (Chapter II) is devoted to the question
whether diminishing shares of European exporters in ASEAN markets can
be regarded as a "special case" where market-separating factors favour
neighbouring suppliers such as those from Japan, or whether there was
a fairly uniform pattern of export performances of individual countries in
various import markets in the 1970-1984 period. Since such a pattern
seems to emerge from the comparison of -European, Japanese and US
trade shares in major world markets and geographical proximity can be
ruled out as a decisive determinant for access to ASEAN markets
(Section II.3), marketing strategies applied by exporters from different
countries come into focus. Chapter III evaluates the role of marketing
strategies in penetrating Southeast Asian markets and assesses dif-
ferences in these strategies between the major suppliers from Europe,
Japan, and the US. From this analysis, foreign direct investment (FDI)
emerges as a major clue to export expansion, and hence, the relationship
between FDI and export performance including the importance of intra-
firm trade as an engine of export growth is further elaborated in
Chapter IV.
Since ASEAN countries do not discriminate between foreign suppliers and
investors, the roots of the relative neglect of ASEAN markets by Euro-
pean firms must be sought elsewhere. Economic reasoning suggests that
European firms operate in a framework of incentives which render ex-
ports to and investment in other markets more profitable than such busi-
ness relationships with ASEAN countries. This hypothesis is put to an
empirical test in two ways. Firstly, the institutional environment sur-
rounding trade and investment decisions of German, Japanese and US
firms are compared to identify incentives or disincentives for doing
business with ASEAN countries (Chapter V). And secondly, trade and
industrial policies of the European Communities (EC) are scrutinized with
respect to their impact on the attractiveness of business relations with
"third countries" vis-a-vis those with other EC member countries
(Chapter VI).The results of this analysis lead to two sets of policy conclusions
(Chapter VII). Concerning international competitiveness of European
firms, they provide indications for crucial areas in which company strat-
egies and macroeconomic policies need to be adjusted to strengthen the
competitive position of these firms both at home and abroad. Looking
more specifically at ASEAN markets, the findings allow to evaluate recent
EC recommendations for fostering closer economic relations between the
EC and ASEAN countries with respect to their potential efficacy.II. A Comparison of the EC, Japanese, and US Trade Performance in the
1970s and 1980s
1. EC Losses in Rapidly Growing ASEAN Markets - Establishing the Case
Over the last two decades, the five member countries (1) of ASEAN,
i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand,
have evolved into an economic growth pole of increasing global import-
ance. They were not only successful in raising the productive capacity
of their economies but also in integrating themselves into the inter-
national division of labour with non-traditional goods. Manufactured ex-
ports grew more rapidly in ASEAN countries than in all developing coun-
tries taken together, and the ASEAN share in total manufactured exports
from developing countries increased from 12 per cent in 1965 to more
than 18 per cent in 1983 (Table Al).
As a corollary to export expansion, import demand grew at a similar pace
(18 per cent in 1963-1981; for details see Ariff, Hill [1985, Chapter 2]),
and ASEAN countries became an important market for exports of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Between
1970 and 1984, the share of ASEAN countries in total OECD exports in-
creased from 2.0 per cent to 2.9 per cent (Table 1) and this increase
was even more pronounced in advanced industrial goods like machinery
and transport equipment (2.5 per cent to 4.0 per cent with a peak of
4.5 per cent in 1982). The combined import volume of the five countries
amounted to about half the size of total imports of the much more devel-
oped Latin American countries and about two thirds of total African im-
ports [UN, b].
The question of who among the OECD exporters has most successfully
exploited the opportunities provided by a fast growing absorptive
capacity of ASEAN markets can easily be answered on the basis of trade
(1) The sixth member, Brunei Darussalam, which joined in January 1984,
is not included in this study.Table 1 - Share of OECD Exports to ASEAN in Total OECD Exports,
1970, 1982 and 1984 (per cent) (a)
Food and beverages (0-1)
Crude materials excluding fuels (2+4)
Chemicals (5)


















Source: OECD [e]; own calculations.
data presented in Table 2. EC exporters have lost trade shares to other
OECD exporters, not to mention those from NICs and other developing
countries. Total EC losses to other OECD members were in the range of
25 per cent - based on an initial share of more than 28 per cent of total
OECD exports to ASEAN countries in 1970 - but amounted up to 40 per
cent in the product category "machinery and transport equipment".
Modest gains in trade shares of the category "other manufactures" failed
to outweigh losses in all other product categories.
Table 2 - Share of the EC (a), the US and Japan in OECD Exports to
ASEAN, 1970, 1982 and 1984 (per cent) (b)

















































































Source: OECD [e]; own calculations.The list of gainers comprises quite a number of countries whose individ-
ual export success roughly depends on their resource endowment. For
instance, neither the EC and the US nor Japan could keep their shares
in food products and crude materials. Here, all three major OECD
trading partners incurred losses in ASEAN markets to other OECD mem-
bers like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. With rising degrees of
processing, the balance sheet of gains and losses is confined to the EC,
the US and Japan. Except in the most important category of machinery
and transport equipment, where both the US and Japan captured EC
losses in almost equal parts, patterns of change in shares were quite
different among the two major EC competitors. Japan which had occupied
a dominating trade position in ASEAN countries already in 1970 was
unable to defend this position in resource-intensive manufactures (SITG
6-8) and chemicals (SITC 5). In total, Japanese gains and losses were
balanced so that its forty per cent share in OECD exports to ASEAN
countries remained almost constant during the 1970s and early 1980s.
The US, on the other hand, gained shares in chemicals and the
machinery industry before and after 1982 irrespective of the movements
of the dollar exchange rate. On average, the US suppliers have slightly
increased their share in total OECD exports to ASEAN countries and
displaced the EC as the second largest foreign supplier of imports to the
region.
2. Declining Competitiveness of EC Suppliers in ASEAN Markets - Singular Case or
Symptom?
a. Theoretical Underpinnings
EC losses of import market shares in the ASEAN region would not give
reason for concern with respect to the international competitiveness of
EC suppliers, if such losses were confined to Southeast Asian markets.
Exports to these markets account only for a small portion of total EC
exports, and slow growth of these exports could easily be compensatedby gains in other markets. Several studies [e.g. Finger, Yeats, 1976;
Sautter, 1983] have in fact shown distance to be an important variable in
explaining bilateral trade flows. Hence, it does not seem surprising that
in 1983, 58 per cent of Latin American imports from industrialized
countries originated from the North American hemisphere, 64 per cent of
African imports from the EC, and 40 per cent of Southeast and East
Asian imports from Japan [GATT, 1984, Table A29].
These observations suggest a market-specific competitive advantage of
certain suppliers based on geographical proximity, protectionism, or
exogenous factors commonly referred to as "advantages of cultural and
ethnical proximity". However, there are a priori reasons to assume that
the importance of some of these market-separating factors has diminished
in the 1970s and early 1980s:
- The "natural trade resistance" factor in world trade determined by
transport costs has become increasingly weaker in the course of
technical innovations in transportation techniques (containerization, air
cargo), particularly for advanced manufactured goods [Ramsey, 1978;
Shipping 2000, 1979; Langhammer, 1983].
- A similar consideration applies to cultural barriers which were lowered
with the English language emerging as a commonly used working
language for instructions, services and marketing and vast improve-
ments in the international information network through telecommuni-
cation .
- Tariff and non-tariff barriers are higher in resource-based and
labour-intensive goods (agriculture, textiles, steel) than in advanced,
human capital-intensive manufactures such as investment goods mainly
supplied by industrialized countries [ Cline et al. , 1978; GATT, 1979].
As far as trade barriers impede access to markets of developing coun-
tries, they equally apply to suppliers from all industrialized countries.
If these contentions were empirically valid, one would not expect the
declining competitiveness of EC suppliers on ASEAN markets to be a
singular case but rather a symptom for a more general erosion of their
international competitiveness. To test this hypothesis, the performance ofEC, German, Japanese and US exporters on ASEAN and EC markets was
compared to their performance on the aggregate world markets. ASEAN
and EC markets should offer special advantages to Japanese and EC sup-
pliers respectively, if market-separating factors play an important role,
while the analysis of the world market provides a convenient reference
scheme for the shifts in the two regional markets. The US are equi-
distant between the two regional import markets, and the US performance
on these markets should, therefore, provide an additional indication for
the strength of market separation. Further, the analysis focuses on more
advanced manufactured goods in the SITC categories 7 and 8 (71-79 and
87-88) , in which industrialized countries are believed to enjoy a com-
parative advantage vis-a-vis developing nations (1). The international
competitiveness in these products will have a major impact on the future
export performance of industrialized countries.
b. Empirical Evidence
Table 3 shows 1970, 1982, and 1984 market shares of the competing
countries/regions in the three reference markets. The aggregates (bot-
tom rows) show a fairly uniform pattern which is not significantly affec-
ted by substantial exchange rate variations in the early 1980s. Japan did
not only score gains on ASEAN markets for advanced industrial goods
(SITC 7+87+88) where Japan already accounted for more than one third
of respective OECD exports in 1970, but also on EC and world markets
(7.4 and 13.5 percentage points, respectively). In absolute and relative
terms, these gains were larger than Japanese gains on ASEAN markets.
The EC as a whole lost shares in all markets as did, to a smaller
degree, West Germany while the US show a mixed performance with in-
(1) The SITC categories included in the analysis accounted for roughly
60 per cent of manufactured exports of industrialized countries in
1982. Chemical products (SITC category 5) have been excluded from
the analysis since competitiveness in these products is - to a sub-
stantial degree - related to the availability of crude oil at low
prices. Domestic oil resources seem to provide a competitive edge to
US manufacturers of chemicals which could boost their shares in both
Asian and world markets in the 1970s [Hiemenz, 1984, p. 8].Table 3 - Share of Major Industrialized Countries in OECD Countries'
Exports of Advanced Industrial Goods to the World, the EC (a)
and ASEAN, 1970, 1982 and 1984 (b)
Power generating machinery (71)
Machinery specialized for
particular industries (72)
Metal working machinery (73)
General industrial machinery
and equipment (74)
Office machines and automatic




appliances and parts (77)
Road vehicles (78)





Total (7 + 87 + 88)
Power generating machinery (71)
Machinery specialized for
particular industries (72)
Metal working machinery (73)
General industrial machinery
and equipment (74)
Office machines and automatic




appliances and parts (77)
Road vehicles (78)
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(a) Data for the EC refer to BC-9 in 1970 and to EC-10 in 1982 and 1984. Due to the negligible share of
Greece in EC-10 exports of advanced industrial goods (less than 0.5 per cent) there is no distortion
arising from the different country coverage. - (b) Numbers in brackets: data for 1970 recorded in SITC
Rev. 1 have been converted to Rev. 2.
Source: OECD [e]; own calculations.
creasing shares in ASEAN and losses in EC and world markets. The EC
suppliers were fairly successful in defending "fortress Europe" [Wolf,
1983] and, despite losses, managed to retain a two thirds share in EC
markets. There are indications, however, that the strong position of
local producers on EC markets was rather maintained by national and EC
protectionist policies than by competitive strength. The heavy EC losses
on markets outside the EC and the fact that not only Japanese but also
US exporters could compete successfully with EC exporters on these
markets hints at a declining international competitiveness of EC sup-
pliers .11
An analysis of the 50 three-digit product categories included in SITC
7+87+88 reinforces the above conclusions (1). Decreasing EC trade shares
were by no means restricted to a few industries or small markets in
which Japanese or American suppliers may have a special advantage.
Only in eight out of the fifty product groups within the SITC 7+87+88
category, the EC could gain shares on world markets between 1970 and
1984. These few successful export categories were largely identical with
those nine product groups in which the EC gained on ASEAN markets.
Though the EC performance appeared to be somewhat better on the in-
ternal EC market, still thirty-two groups, that is almost two thirds, in-
curred losses. The only clear export stronghold of the EC as a whole
concerns two industries, power generating machinery and aircraft, but
at least in the latter industry successful market penetration was not
based on genuine competitiveness but on high government subsidies paid
to the European Airbus Industry.
The German export industry has performed better on all three reference
markets than competitors from other EC countries. Yet, the sectoral
pattern of gains and losses is again very similar on all three markets
indicating an erosion of the international competitiveness of the German
industry, too. This follows from an analysis of similarities of changes in
trade shares presented elsewere [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1985]. Both
rank correlation coefficients between changes of market shares and ex-
port overlap indices show that US and Japanese exporters were able to
penetrate EC markets with products which were successfully sold in
other markets as well, i.e., the US and Japan have captured shares in
all regional markets in product categories in which EC suppliers were
losing out. A deviation from this general pattern is provided by the -
compared to other EC countries - more open German economy. West
Germany enjoyed a more robust market position vis-a-vis Japan than the
other EC members. Neither in ASEAN nor in the EC market were German
losses pocketed by Japanese industries. Instead, the US emerged as a
stronger competitor to West Germany. This may be explained by a rel-
atively high initial level of inter-industry specialization between Japan
(1) To economize on space, respective data are not reproduced here.
They are available from the authors upon request.12
and West Germany and by more intra-industry specialization between the
US and West Germany. It is between the two latter countries where gains
and losses were shifted in all markets during the observed period. In
ASEAN markets, however, gains of Japanese industries were mainly to
the detriment of American suppliers. The general picture emerging from
this analysis is that of European exporters being chased by US com-
petitors and both being chased by Japan; a picture which is most accen-
tuated on the relatively small ASEAN markets.
3. Do Transport Costs Matter?
The above findings suggest that market-separating factors no longer
play a decisive role in determining export success in foreign markets.
Looking at EC and ASEAN countries, one may, however, argue that
distance still matters for these geographically remote regions. Therefore,
available information on transport costs is used to test whether Japan
owes part of her outstanding export performance in Southeast Asia to
locational advantages reflected in transport cost differentials vis-a-vis
US and European competitors.
The analysis is based on the Philippine trade statistics which provide
imports valued in US $ both on a fob (free-on-board) as well as on a cif
(cost-insurance-freight) basis. The ratio of cif to fob values is a
measure of the ad valorem incidence of transport costs (1). The Philip-
pines is the only ASEAN country for which cif/ fob import values are
available. This country is best suited for such an analysis of transport
cost differentials, because Japanese foreign affiliates which could bias
the comparison of Japanese, US, and European exports through intra-
firm trade, are not as dominant in the Philippines as in other ASEAN
countries (see Chapter IV below).
(I) This ratio excludes the costs of loading in the exporting country's
port and thus is inferior to the ratio of cif-"free alongside ship"
value applied in other studies. However, as one can assume costs of
stevedoring and cranage in the ports of the major industrialized
countries to be roughly the same, there is not much distortion in
applying cif-fob ratios.BibHothe
des Institute fur
Estimates of the ad valorem incidence of transport costs in Philippine
imports from different sources of origin are based on a sample of about
160 manufactured commodities imported in 1970 and 1983, at the highest
level of disaggregation (seven-digit level). This level helps to exclude
product heterogeneity to the largest possible extent. Only those commod-
ities were included in the sample which were imported from Japan as well
as from the US and the EC in the respective year. Cif-fob ratios for
imports from two exporting countries were divided by each other and
used as a proxy for transport cost differentials in identical commodities.
Averages of such differentials are estimated by using common weights.
Both the selection of commodities imported from several industrialized
countries and the use of common weights aim at preventing calculations
on average transport cost differentials to be distorted by different prod-
uct compositions and by different weights in imports from industrialized
countries (1). The methods applied are described in detail in Appen-
dix A.
Table 4 displays the weighted average ad valorem incidence of transport
costs in Philippine manufactured imports from the US, Japan and EC
suppliers in 1970 and 1983. Three major results emerge:
1) In spite of rocketing prices for fuels in sea-borne transport during
this period, transport costs decreased or at least stagnated on
average (SITC 5-8).
2) Transport costs vary among products, especially for long-distance
suppliers. Though they are in general lower for sophisticated high-
value products (SITC 7) than for less processed goods such as
chemicals, the estimates do not suggest a straightforward relationship
between product sophistication and transport costs.
3) Long-distance suppliers such as West Germany do not seem to face
consistently higher transport costs than Japanese suppliers. This may
be due to the high degree of sophistication in West German products
which have a higher unit value than those originating from Japan,
(1) For a controversy on the product composition effect in the estimates
of Indian transport cost disadvantages see Sapir [1983] and Yeats
[1983].14
Table 4 - Weighted Average Ad Valorem Incidence of Transport Costs (a)
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where T is the import-weighted ad valorem rate of transport costs, MT and M^ are
the Philippine US $ import values in the seven-digit SITC item on a cif and fob basis
respectively. - (b) Imports from the most important individual EC supplier.
Source: Republic of the Philippines [1970; 1983]; own calculations.
but may also be explained by massive technological innovations (con-
tainerization) in the dense sea transport network between Europe and
Southeast Asia during the 1970s.
Differences of average transport costs between imports from different
sources suggest that these costs do also differ between exporting
countries for identical commodities. This hypothesis implies pairwise
transport cost differentials for commodities imported from two selected
industrialized countries to differ from unity in a statistically significant
way. Table 5 shows that
- US manufactures face a significant transport cost disadvantage not
only vis-a-vis competing Japanese imports in the range of about 70 to
80 per cent on average, but in many cases also vis-a-vis EC sup-
pliers. This result holds for 1970 as well as for 1983. However, the
transport cost disadvantage of US suppliers vis-a-vis EC suppliers is15
Table 5 - Weighted Average Transport Cost Differentials (a) in Philippine
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Source: See Table 4.
by far less systematic across products as in the US/Japan case as the
statistical test indicates;
- Japan's competitive edge due to transport cost advantages has been
the highest vis-a-vis the US, but plays a role vis-a-vis European sup-
pliers, too. It is, however, interesting to note that, in the most im-
portant product category, machinery and transport equipment, Japan
has enjoyed a significant transport cost advantage neither against West
Germany and other EC suppliers in both years nor against the US in
1983. The excess of the competitors' transport costs over those of Jap-
anese suppliers in this product category has not been systematic, but
rather at random;16
Table 6 - Average Transport Cost Disadvantages (a) on the Philippine
Market of German and US Suppliers vis-a-vis Japan, and of US


















































(a) Transport cost-induced excess of cif import unit values in per cent of cif
import unit values for imports from Japan and Vfest Germany respectively. In alge-
T (TCD—1} braical terms: iQQ + T • -
 n-s. = disadvantage is not statistically significant
at the 1 per cent level.
Source: See Table. 4.
- transport costs between goods shipped from West Germany and other
EC member states are not significantly different.
The major conclusion to be drawn from these statistical tests is that dif-
ferentials do not seem to reflect geographical proximity but product pe-
culiarities and differences in transportation media and technology.
Transport cost-induced price disadvantages incurred by the US and West
German exporters (1) vis-a-vis Japan and by the US producers vis-a-vis
the West German competitors range between 2 and 23 per cent with an
average rate of 4-5 per cent for all manufactures (Table 6). This dif-
ferential is equivalent to a hypothetical margin of preference for Jap-
anese goods over US and EC goods. In 1970-1983, these margins have
not changed much vis-a-vis West Germany but have slightly increased
(1) West Germany as the largest individual EC supplier on the Philippine
market has been taken as a proxy for the competitive position of the
European Community with respect to transport costs. This seems
justified by statistically insignificant transport cost differentials be-
tween exports shipped from West Germany and other EC countries to
the Philippines (Table 5).17
vis-a-vis the US. In light of the relatively small transport cost
advantage of Japanese suppliers, it is not surprising that a comparison
of growth rates of Philippine imports from the US, Japan and West
Germany, the corresponding trade shares and their changes (Table A2),
and the transport cost disadvantages do not provide empirical support
for a causal relationship between the trade figures and transport cost
disadvantages.18
III. The Role of Marketing Strategies in Penetrating ASEAN Markets
1. On the Importance of Marketing Strategies for Export Expansion
If market-separating factors can by and large be ruled out as determi-
nants of declining EC trade shares in ASEAN markets, competitive disad-
vantages of European suppliers have to accrue from either higher costs
of production or deficient marketing strategies. The importance of ap-
propriate marketing strategies for penetrating foreign markets is often
underrated although these strategies are an important determinant for
the success of any exporter. This can be gathered from the considerable
value added produced by final distribution of exports in the target
market.
A questionnaire survey of foreign trading companies in four Asian coun-
tries suggested, for example, that marketing and distribution costs of
imported products in the final market amounted to as much as 27 per
cent of the final user's price for machinery and engineering equipment,
36 per cent for chemicals, 51 per cent for medical supply and 53 per
cent for non-durable consumer goods [ESCAP/UNCTC, 1985, Table 56].
As a matter of fact, actual production costs are smaller than marketing
and distribution costs for numerous products. It follows, that compara-
tive advantages of exporters in marketing and distribution may be just
as important as those in the sphere of production. This holds true in
particular for industries which are vertically integrated down to the
distribution level.
Appropriate marketing and distribution channels may even be a more
essential ingredient to export success in ASEAN countries than elsewhere
since markets of ASEAN member countries have remained separated from
each other by substantial trade barriers. Attempts to arrive at a free
trade area, not to speak of a customs union or higher stages of economic
integration, remained rudimentary. Today, the common umbrella "ASEAN"
still stands for political rather than for economic co-operation. This is at
best characterized by the fact that trade policies are still under national19
competence and that preferential tariff reductions failed to promote intra-
regional trade because of their very limited coverage [Rieger, 1985;
Wong, 1985; Ooi, 1986]. So did attempts towards regional industrializa-
tion planning. Hence, foreign firms have to adapt their sales strategies
to the specific conditions prevailing in each of the six ASEAN countries.
Furthermore, there are at least four other characteristics common to the
countries under review which further augment the importance of appro-
priate marketing in this region:
1) ASEAN product markets are highly segmented owing to the unequal
distribution of income of consumers as well as firms. The positioning
of products within a particular market is therefore of utmost im-
portance. Marketing and distribution channels have to be chosen ac-
cordingly in order to be effective.
2) Long-term company and personal relations play an outstanding role.
The importance of personal rather than functional relations requires
long-term commitments for the establishment of distribution channels.
3) Brand consciousness is pronounced not only for Westernized local
elites, but also in low-price market segments, where consumers can
hardly take the risk of switching to unknown brands. This under-
scores the importance of marketing.
4) More generally, the markets of Southeast Asian developing countries
are no longer open markets in the sense of sellers' markets. This
holds true across the board for consumer, intermediate and capital
goods imports. Competition is stiff, as Japanese, US, European and
other Asian suppliers vie among each other and with local companies
for future market shares. Marketing strategies figure in the forefront
of this competition.
In connection with the declining share of European companies in Asian
imports, the two following central questions emerge:
1) Are there any significant differences between the export and mar-
keting strategies of European, US, Japanese and other Asian manu-
facturers supplying the countries under review? If yes, what is the
background to these differences?20
2) If there are any significant differences, to what extent do they lend
themselves as explanation for the declining role of European companies
in Southeast Asian markets?
The subsequent sections seek to shed light on these questions by exa-
mining major aspects of the institutional organisation of export channels
selected by companies exporting to the countries under review and by
relating these institutional choices to the respective export performance.
The major results are summarized in Section III.3.
2. Export Marketing Strategies in Comparison
a. Concepts and Data
The options available to foreign firms engaging in exports to ASEAN
markets vary from sporadic exports upon request only to investment in
assembly or production facilities in the final market. This choice requires
primarily a decision of the exporter on the amount of resources he is
prepared to invest in the distribution channel. One may distinguish the
following six alternatives for penetrating foreign markets:
1. sporadic exports without any representative or agent in the region;
2. appointment of a trading company from the home country or region of
the exporter as an agent;
3. appointment of a local trading company as importer and distributor;
4. establishment of a marketing affiliate in the foreign market;
5. establishment of assembly or production facilities abroad;
6. licensing of foreign manufacturing companies.
Channels 1 to 5 are put into an order of increasing costs required to set
up export governance structures [ Roehl et al. , 1984], The question is
to which degree European, Japanese and US exporters rely on these
different channels and to what extent this could be related to their suc-
cess in ASEAN markets.21
There is hardly any readily available data to answer these questions.
Therefore, a new approach is employed towards analysing the institu-
tional patterns of international trade, referred to as trade channel ana-
lysis (1). In addition, the evidence is drawn from the results of a
questionnaire survey on foreign trading companies operating in Asia (for
details, see von Kirchbach [1985, pp. 10-14]).
The trade channel analysis basically reclassifies foreign trade statistics
by types of traders using the original customs declaration for all export
and import transactions. This technique allows to calculate the involve-
ment of different types of traders in exports and imports for each prod-
uct. In addition, a number of trader-specific characteristics can be
derived, such as average export and import unit values, product and
geographical specializations and average size of transactions.
The remaining loopholes have largely been remedied by the results of an
interview survey of 132 foreign trading companies in the Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand conducted in 1982 which in-
cluded the nine affiliates of the major Japanese trading houses (sogo
shosha) (2).
Entering or operating in ASEAN markets exclusively from an exporter's
sales department without any permanent representative in the target
market (Channel 1) would appear to be the least costly approach from
the point of view of the exporter. However, this approach has become
increasingly difficult and rare. For most products, this is related to the
initially low slope of the sales response function (relationship between
marketing efforts over time and demand). This relationship implies that
market entry initially requires a substantial amount of marketing efforts.
Only beyond a certain threshold value does demand respond more elasti-
(1) The concept of the trade channel analysis was developed in connec-
tion with research on transnational trading corporations, which one
of the authors, Friedrich von Kirchbach, carried out for the
ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit on Transnational Corporations, United Na-
tions Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bang-
kok.
(2) A list of companies interviewed is given in von Kirchbach
[1985, Annex Table 3].22
cally to additional marketing efforts. This shape of the sales-response
function is due to the above-mentioned reasons, which make marketing
and distribution strategies a key factor for the success of exporters,
i.e., intra-ASEAN trade barriers, market segmentation, importance of
long-term personal relations, brand consciousness and general competi-
tiveness of markets. Although it is difficult to prove this point empiri-
cally, there are indications that direct selling without any permanent
representative plays a minor role for all OECD exports to the region
[von Kirchbach, 1985, pp. 15-17]. The crucial decisions to be made by
foreign firms with respect to appropriate marketing strategies are,
therefore, related to the use and selection of trading companies, the
establishment of own marketing affiliates, and investment in assembly or
production subsidiaries. The relevance of this choice emerges from an
evaluation of observed differences in the positioning of products between
the major foreign suppliers of Thailand.
b. Positioning of Products and Market Penetration
The positioning of products within a specific market in terms of prices
and quality is a key variable in marketing. In the context of the present
study, this point gains particular weight because of the pronounced seg-
mentation of markets in Asia. With the exception of a few Latin American
countries, there is probably no other region in the world in which the
sources of demand comprise the entire range from leading manufacturers
employing state-of-the-art technology and consumers rich by any
standard down to backyard shops and rural households with very limited
cash income.
Each of the various market segments has its own growth and mobility
pattern. This has further complicated the appropriate positioning of
products as both the pronounced segmentation and the dynamic devel-
opment of each segment have to be taken into account.
In relation to the positioning of products in terms of pricing, the dif-
ferences between European, US, Japanese and other Asian exporters
appear to be very pronounced indeed. In general, European companies23
have aimed at the top price segments, whereas Japanese and even more
so other Asian companies have responded to the medium and bottom price
segments of the demand curve. This has often confined the commerciali-
zation of European products to the comparatively small and price-inelastic
demand of well-to-do, urban and Westernized consumers and the most
advanced manufacturing units. In contrast, Japanese exporters have
been far more successful in penetrating the more price-sensitive, but
large and rapidly-growing middle-income segment and partly even
entered the traditional market segment, to which many of the exporters
from other Asian developing countries cater.
These differences in the positioning of products emerge from a compar-
ison of import unit values for Thailand [von Kirchbach, 1985, Table 14].
Average import prices were clearly the highest for imports from the EC,
followed by those from the US. Average import prices from Japan were
much lower, on average even below those of imports from other Asian
countries. Although these indices do not reveal to what extent price
differences reflect the positioning of products in terms of quality (i.e.
product heterogeneity) or cost advantages, the significant differences
point to a competitive advantage of Japanese suppliers in the price-con-
scious Asian markets (1).
The differences in pricing strategies become more obvious at a disag-
gregated product level. An overview of Thai average import prices by
sectors, countries of origin and trade channels [von Kirchbach, 1985,
Annex Tables 14-17] makes the reliance of European exporters on high-
price and high-quality products distributed by agency houses particu-
larly evident.
Import prices of foreign agency houses have often been high not only in
comparison to local trading companies but also in relation to import
prices of foreign-affiliated manufacturing companies or marketing af-
filiates. This reflects primarily the different approach of overseas manu-
(1) Pre-feasibility studies made available by a German consultant firm
confirm prices of German capital goods to be much higher in e.g.
Indonesia, than prices for Japanese or Taiwanese substitutes.24
facturers. Those appointing distributors rather than establishing their
own sales affiliates often attach marginal importance to the market con-
cerned. They tend to fix prices at a high level in order to cream off the
top-price segment of demand. Principals establishing their own sales or
manufacturing subsidiary generally assess the market more optimistically.
They are more likely to adopt a long-term market development strategy
and to export at marginal prices.
These differences are most pronounced for products such as pharma-
ceuticals or electronic consumer goods requiring little adaptation to local
market conditions. There are a few examples of Asian manufacturing
subsidiaries of European companies, which have successfully employed
this latter strategy and have been able to establish themselves firmly in
markets for standard nondurable consumer goods in urban as well as in
rural areas. Nestle's production and sales of Chinese noodles in Malaysia
and Unilever's success with soap in Indonesia are cases in point. In
general, however, European companies seem to have devoted only margi-
nal marketing efforts to ASEAN countries.
c. The Contribution of Trading Houses to Export Expansion
Concerning trading companies, the major competititors offering their ser-
vices to foreign exporters are European agency houses and Japanese as
well as local ASEAN trading companies (Channels 2,3). There are only
few international US trading companies since until recently foreign trade
played a minor role for the US economy and exports were concentrated
in the hands of the leading multinational corporations [Bello, Williamson,
1982].
European agency houses have historically evolved as the central economic
link between the colonial powers and their colonies. Their core activity
has been the import and distribution of final goods and services from
non-affiliated principals. They typically administer a portfolio of distri-
butorship contracts, which grant them exclusive marketing rights for the
products of their principals. European agency houses have been most25
active in those countries of the region which were under European
colonial rule, i.e. , in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
What is common to all agency houses is the primary orientation of each
affiliate to the final market. Agency houses tend to be fairly independent
of their headquarters, and geographical and product diversification has
been less essential to survival than their country-specific experience.
The agency houses' intimate knowledge of their final markets, in which
many of them have been operating for several decades, has been the
major asset they have offered to their principals. Against this back-
ground, one would expect to find many European manufacturers with
limited resources for export marketing appointing agency houses as their
distributors in Asian markets.
A closer investigation shows that in the early 1980s the European agency
houses handled only a very small percentage of total imports of the
countries under review and that this share was further eroding. In
Thailand, the share of the 19 major agency houses (including three small
American ones) was 2.6 per cent in 1980, according to the questionnaire
survey (see Table A3). The trade channel analysis confirms this order
of magnitude indicating that the 23 foreign-affiliated agency houses,
figuring among Thailand's 1000 top importers, handled 1.8 per cent of
total Thai imports (excluding transactions on commission basis, which do
not enter the customs statistics under the name of the commission agent;
Table 7). In Malaysia, the share of 13 agency houses (out of which one
was non-European) in total imports was 2.0 per cent in 1980, and - for
comparison - in the Republic of Korea their share was even lower with
0.8 per cent of total Korean imports. Although no empirical data was
available for Indonesia and the Philippines, factual evidence suggests
that the share of the European agency houses in total imports was even
smaller in these countries. Moreover, imports of the agency houses have
been growing at rates clearly inferior to those of national import growth.
The average annual growth rate of all agency houses included in the
survey and weighted by the size of each company's imports amounted to
7.4 per cent over the years from 1975 to 1980, i.e., about one third of
import growth at the national level.26
The declining role of European agency houses is clearly not only the
result of the decreasing share of ASEAN imports from Europe. The
questionnaire survey suggests that only between 6 and 10 per cent of
total imports of Malaysia and Thailand from Europe were handled by
agency houses (Table A3). The reasons behind the declining importance
of European agency houses are manifold [von Kirchbach, 1985,
pp. 27-32], but - among other things - many agency houses had diffi-
culties in competing with local trading companies and the Japanese sogo
shosha.
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major products) on own account in Bant mill.; numbers in
each trading channel in imports. - (b) BOI: Board of In-
FTC: Foreign Trading Companies. - (d) Includes 354 of the
Source: Unpublished data provided by Department of Business Economics,
Ministry of Commerce, Thailand; own calculations.
The term Japanese general trading companies or sogo shosha refers to
Japan's nine largest trading companies Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsui & Co.,28
C. Itoh & Co., Marubeni Corp., Sumitomo Corp., Nissho-Iwai Corp.,
Toyo Menka Kaisha, Kanematsu-Gosho, and Nichimen. They are the
world's largest trading companies, handling close to 50 per cent of Jap-
anese foreign trade and approximately 4 per cent of world trade. They
are truly general trading companies, with subsidiaries all over the world
(Table A4), involvement in some 20 000 different products and a high
degree of functional diversification (for details, see e.g., Kojima, Ozawa
[1984]). The involvement of the sogo shosha is the most striking dif-
ference when comparing export marketing strategies of Japanese manu-
facturers with those of Western exporters.
Preliminary estimates based on the interview survey suggest a 15-20 per
cent share of sogo shosha in total ASEAN imports. This size of operation
seems to have permitted the realization of substantial economies of scale.
In contrast to the European agency houses, final consumer goods were
only of marginal importance in sogo shosha imports, whereas intermediate
goods (steel products and chemicals) and machinery accounted for the
bulk of their imports (Table A5). The major strength of sogo shosha lies
in the international allocation of buyers and sellers. Although this is a
relatively low value-added activity compared to final distribution, for
instance, it requires vast investments to establish a world-wide network
of information and communication. The international network of the sogo
shosha is practically unrivalled, and it is used to offset a particularly
critical handicap of most Third-World-based importers and exporters,
namely limited knowledge of overseas markets.
From the point of view of Japanese export manufacturers and overseas
investors, the involvement of the sogo shosha has been invited as risk
absorbers and in order to tap the sogo shosha
1 s vast potential of infor-
mation, experience and connections in the respective overseas markets as
well as their access to financial resources. This has been of prime im-
portance for the small and medium-size exporters, which could hardly
have ventured abroad on their own (Table A6). Significantly, Japanese
medium-size companies have been able to participate to a much larger
extent in exports to and overseas investment in all Asian countries than
medium-size companies from the US or Europe have done. The avail-
ability of the sogo shosha services as export marketing vehicle has un-29
doubtedly been one of the major advantages of second-tier manufacturers
from Japan over their Western competitors in Southeast Asian markets.
The same holds true for the other end of the spectrum: the sogo shosha
have proven to be very successful in organizing consortia for projects
too large or too risky for any individual company. As the most important
organizers of Japanese plant exports, they handled the bulk of these
exports which amounted to approximately US $ 10 bill, per annum in the
early 1980s and out of which about one third was exported to developing
Asia [MITI, b; Young, 1979, p. 203].
Not surprisingly, the sogo shosha are so well established in ASEAN and
OECD countries that they have been involved, to a growing extent, in
exports from the US, Europe, and other developing countries to the
countries under review. In Thailand, for instance, the sogo shosha
handled 21.2 per cent of all imports from North America in 1980 as well
as 6.0 per cent of imports from Australia and New Zealand; their imports
from Europe had reached 2.7 per cent of total imports from Europe and
were equivalent to 27.1 per cent of the agency houses' imports from
Europe [von Kirchbach, 1985, p. 44].
In sum, the sogo shosha have greatly facilitated the access to Southeast
(and East) Asian markets for Japanese exporters. They have functioned
as readily available export marketing channels to large and small manu-
facturers, alike. Their powerful position within Japan's industrial conglo-
merates has put them into a unique position as two-way communicators
and organizers, transmitting export opportunities in Asia to potential
exporters in Japan and feeding back to them market acceptance in the
final market and adaptation requirements. Due to their functional diver-
sification, the sogo shosha have been able to enhance Japanese exports
to developing Asia, irrespective of the specific organization of the export
marketing channel. Not only have they handled approximately half of
Japanese exports to the region, but they have also been active in link-
ing up Japanese exporters and local distributors, and they were Japan's
largest investors in the countries under review.30
A relatively new link in the chain of marketing activities in ASEAN
countries are local import and distribution companies which have mul-
tiplied over the last two decades. The share of local trading companies
(Channel 3) in the region's imports has reached a significant level. In
Malaysia, locally-controlled limited companies in the wholesale and retail
sector handled 13.5 per cent of total imports in 1980, excluding the im-
port activities of the large number of partnerships and individual pro-
prietorships (Table 8). In Thailand, imports (on own account) of the 57
largest local trading companies amounted to 5.0 per cent of total imports
in 1980 (Table 7, Column 9). If the several thousand smaller local trad-
ing companies were included, the share of local trading companies is
likely to have been at least twice as high. In Indonesia and the Philip-
pines, local trading companies played a major role in national imports
because of restrictions on the activities of foreign-affiliated companies in
wholesaling and retailing and because of the comparatively advanced
development of local entrepreneurship in the Philippines.
There is reason to believe that the reliance on local importers and distri-
butors differed significantly between manufacturers from Europe, Japan
and the US. Japanese companies appear to have been more prepared to
co-operate with local trading companies in the countries under review
than European and US manufacturers, and European manufacturers have
probably used local distributors slightly more than US companies. There
are three different factors which could explain this difference between
Japanese and Western exporters:
1) Japanese manufacturers have generally responded more intensively
than US and European firms to the demand in the large and fast
growing transitional and traditional market segments. Motor cycles and
electrical household appliances such as fans, radios, and TVs are
prime examples among consumer goods. Penetrating these markets
required much more of a grass-root level sales organisation than con-
centrating on the comparatively small urban demand for prestigious
consumption goods and state-of-the-art technology.
2) The presence of the sogo shosha greatly facilitated the identification
of suitable ASEAN importers and distributors and the monitoring of
their activities. To the extent that the sogo shosha were involvedTable 8 - Malaysian Imports by Sectors and Ownership of Importing Companies, 1969, 1976 and 1980








































































































(a) The 1969 data refer to all limited companies irrespective of their size. In 1976, only those companies
were included with revenue of M $ 1 mill, or more. In 1980, the survey covers only companies having M $ 5
mill, revenue or more. The different sample sizes, however, hardly disturb the picture, as the small com-
panies excluded in 1976 and 1980 account for a very small share of total imports.
Source: Dept. of Statistics, Malaysia [var. iss.].32
as commission agents, Japanese exporters had powerful agents at
their disposal to monitor the performance of their ASEAN distributors.
3) The emergence of modern Asian trading companies and the Japanese
export offensive to the countries under review are relatively recent
phenomena and came about after most European and US manufacturers
had already established their export marketing channels. Co-operation
among the former two was therefore particularly attractive.
The empirical evidence available on these issues is, however, not very
significant. According to the trade channel analysis in Thailand, local
trading companies handled 12.2 per cent of the imports from Japan, 11.6
per cent of those from the EC and 9.2 per cent of imports from the US
(Table 9). Yet, the preference of many Japanese exporters to invite
local equity participation in their marketing affiliates in Asia (see sub-
sequent section) matches with the above hypothesis, too. European ex-
porters may have been slightly more inclined to co-operate with local im-
port and distribution companies than US companies because of the con-
siderable number of meanwhile indigenized agency houses of European
origin. Again, however, there is no solid evidence.
d. Establishment of Marketing Affiliates
Downstream integration into international distribution has become
an important element in the efforts of many major OECD manufacturers to
implement global marketing strategies. It has been particularly important
for market leaders in differentiated and marketing-intensive product
markets. Obviously, manufacturers have moved primarily into fast-grow-
ing markets of above-average size. The Asian developing countries have
been a prime example for this trend, in spite of the numerous restric-
tions on the establishment of foreign-owned marketing affiliates. This
may be gathered from the substantial inflow of FDI into the trade sector
of the ASEAN region (Table 10). In Thailand, for instance, the cumula-
tive net inflow of direct investment into the trade sector amounted to
US $ 205.4 mill, or one fifth of direct investment inflows into all sectors
between 1970 and 1980 (calculated from Sibunruang, Brimble [1987,33
Table 9 - Selected Thai Imports (a) by Country of Origin and Import
Channel, 1980
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eluding imports from other major destinations.- (c) Own business of the sogo shosha
and other Asian trading companies. - (d) Excluding transport equipment.
Source: See Table 7.35
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Source: Unpublished data provided by the sources given in the table.
Table 12.4]). While downward integration into overseas marketing and
distribution has been characteristic for multinational corporations in
general (1), there are some notable differences in this respect between
US, European and Japanese manufacturers supplying developing Asia.
In the region as a whole direct marketing through own sales affiliates
(Channel 4) has been particularly important for US companies. This is
mirrored by the considerable share of intra-firm trade of final products
in US total exports (see Section IV.3 below) and the substantial amount
of US direct investment into trade, which amounted to US $ 1.2 bill.
(1981) in eight major Asian countries [U.S. Dept. of Commerce, a, 1982,
p. 22]. Typical examples of US companies channeling their exports to
Asia through overseas marketing affiliates were the oil companies, phar-
maceutical firms and manufacturers of consumer goods. The same held
(1) As a matter of fact, the balance between manufacturing and
marketing activities seems to shift for many leading multinational
corporations into the direction of marketing, increasingly involving
third-party products.36
true for the leading US companies in banking, shipping, advertising,
insurance, auditing, etc. , many of which have established their sub-
sidiaries in the region.
Exports through marketing affiliates have, as the interview survey sug-
gests, not been confined to US manufacturers, but were also typical for
some of the leading European companies, particularly in industries like
chemicals and pharmaceuticals and others which were characterized by
oligopolistic market structures at the global level. In general, it appears
that the differences in export channels between European and US manu-
facturers were primarily the result of size differences of exporters and
of the non-availability of internationally well-established agency houses
in the US.
In contrast, Japanese manufacturers were traditionally more reluctant to
establish fully-owned marketing affiliates. They exhibited a preference
for joint-ventures with local partners in the target market. Collaborating
with local partners - frequently wholesalers and distributors - did not
primarily result from ownership restrictions but rather reflected the at-
tempt of Japanese manufacturers to integrate their local partners' domes-
tic market expertise into their sales affiliates. This was particularly im-
portant for manufacturers catering to the demand for standardized
goods. As a result, the average Japanese equity share in Japanese affil-
iates in commerce located in developing Asia was comparatively low with
75.2 per cent in 1982 [MITI, a,1983]. This was clearly lower than in all
other areas, and notably the OECD countries, with the only exception of
Africa, where similar reasons as in Asia and foreign ownership restric-
tions may have determined the preference for joint-ventures. It was also
lower than the corresponding survey figures for US and European
marketing affiliates [von Kirchbach, 1985, Annex Table 4],
e. Exports via Assembly or Production Affiliates
One of the most fundamental changes in foreign trade patterns of ASEAN
countries has been the increasing share of imports of intermediate goods.37
This process has been fostered by both import substitution and export
expansion and reflects the industrialization process throughout the
region. Against this background, exports of intermediate goods in combi-
nation with assembly or production in affiliated local companies (Chan-
nel 5) have become one of the most important export marketing strategies
for foreign exporters.
The surge of intermediate goods imports followed the reorientation of
ASEAN economies towards import substitution and domestic-market orien-
ted industrialization behind tariff walls. This pattern began in the late
1950s in the Philippines and continued in the mid-1960s in Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia. The region's demand for intermediate goods im-
ports was further increased by the rise of export-oriented industriali-
zation, which began in the East Asian developing countries in the early
1960s, followed by Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines in the late
1960s and early 1970s, and started to affect Thailand and Indonesia in
the late 1970s (for a comprehensive overview, see Ariff, Hill [1985]).
Under the import-substitution regime, intermediate goods exports to Asia
to affiliated production units were, in fact, the only remaining opening
to the domestic markets of ASEAN countries. Automobiles were a prime
example considering the restrictions on imports of completely built-up
cars throughout the region and the growing number of increasingly
stringent local content requirements [ESCAP, 1982], More generally,
high and partly prohibitive effective protection rates have triggered off
a large-scale export substitution process on the part of overseas manu-
facturers, as the various analyses of investment determinants of foreign
companies in the countries under review confirm [von Kirchbach, 1983].
Participating in the rapidly growing demand for intermediate imports by
export-oriented manufacturing units later on required equity investment
in the ASEAN region, just as import-substituting industrialization did
before. During both phases, the creation of captive markets integrated
into the overall industrialization patterns turned out to be the most suc-
cessful way for participating in the region's economic growth. Industrial-
ization in general and the industrial export boom in particular have been
fuelled to a significant extent by foreign-affiliated companies, although38
multinational corporations cannot be considered as having been the
driving force behind the entire region's export success [Hiemenz, 1987],
Yet, the contributions of foreign affiliated companies to industrial ex-
ports varied from 37.3 per cent in 1980 in Thailand to 53.4 per cent in
1982 in Malaysia and 89.7 per cent in 1983 in Singapore [von Kirchbach,
1986].
These high shares prove that foreign companies have swiftly reacted to
the new opportunities arising from the industrialization strategies applied
in ASEAN countries. The region experienced a substantial inflow of FDI
into their manufacturing sectors which increased at a rate of 15-20 per
cent annually in 1976-1983 [GroB, 1985, pp. 3-10].
As a result, foreign-affiliated companies have become the leading type of
importers in many of the countries under review. In Thailand, foreign-
affiliated manufacturers handled 38 per cent of all imports in 1980
(Table 7), notwithstanding the fact that Thailand attracted the smallest
amount of FDI among the ASEAN countries (Table A8). In Malaysia, for-
eign-controlled limited companies in the manufacturing sector handled
24.5 per cent of Malaysian imports in 1980 (Table 8). In the Philip-
pines, 35.8 per cent of all imports in 1970 were done by foreign-affil-
iated companies [von Kirchbach, 1983, p. 275]. In Singapore, this share
is likely to have been much higher, considering that 90 per cent of total
manufactured exports were handled by foreign-affiliated companies in
1983 [Dept. of Statistics, Singapore, 1983].
These figures leave no doubt about the importance of foreign assembly
and manufacturing affiliates as export marketing channels. Again, this
marketing strategy has been pursued in varying degrees by Japanese,
US and European manufacturers, respectively. In 1983, Japanese FDI in
ASEAN manufacturing amounted to US $ 4.23 bill, compared to 1.46 and
US $ 0.21 bill, for US and German multinational companies, respectively
[GroB, 1985, Table 1]. In relative terms, Japanese FDI in ASEAN manu-
facturing amounted to 25 per cent of total manufacturing FDI, whereas
these shares were only 1.6 and 1.0 per cent for US and German FDI.
Even if one looks at total FDI in ASEAN countries, the ranking of in-39
vestors from different home countries remains the same (US $ 10.65,
7.96, and 0.6 bill., respectively).
The argument made here is that FDI may substitute direct exports of
final goods but creates new demand for intermediate goods which more
than offsets losses of exports in the final goods category. An indication
for this assertion can be derived from the 1975 Input-Output Table for
ASEAN countries compiled by IDE [1982]. In 1975, Japanese manufac-
turers accounted for 46.9 per cent of intermediate goods imports of the
region's manufacturing companies from overseas manufacturers, compared
to the 26.9 per cent share of Japanese imports in total imports of the
region. And while Japanese manufacturers exported 87.5 per cent more
final goods to the countries concerned than US manufacturers, the for-
mers' exports of intermediate goods surpassed those of US manufacturers
by about 200 per cent. These results dovetail into the findings of the
trade channel analysis for Thailand (Table 9). Japanese exporters have
channeled the largest share, namely 52.2 per cent, of their exports to
Thailand through affiliated manufacturing companies, compared to 39.4
per cent for US and 25.4 per cent for European exporters. Further
evidence for the export-creating role of FDI as well as a detailed dis-
cussion of the mechanisms at work will be supplied in Chapter IV below.
At this juncture it is, however, safe to state that exports of interme-
diate and also capital goods via affiliated manufacturing units have
proved to be a particularly successful if not the most important export
marketing strategy for OECD firms interested in ASEAN countries. It is
in this field that Japanese companies have secured a clear edge over
their Western competitors.
3. The European, Japanese, and US Approaches to the ASEAN Region
The preceding sections show that the distribution and marketing chan-
nels for European exports to the countries under review have been nar-
row in scope and not fully adapted to the growth pattern of the region.
This comparative disadvantage has been tightly intertwined with the40
Synoptical Table 1 - The Role of ASEAN Economies in the International
















































limited role that has been allocated to this region in the international
division of labour by European companies. In a nutshell, most European
companies have seen the region as an export market for final products,
which was too small and too distant to warrant major commitments for its
penetration. In contrast, Japanese and US companies have pursued a
more comprehensive approach to benefit from the multiform economic po-
tential of the region. The main differences are highlighted in Synoptical
Table 1 and the trade channel analysis of Thai imports by country of
origin presented in Table 11.
The domestic markets of the countries under review have been coveted
by Japanese, European and US manufacturers, alike. The reliance of
many European manufacturers on the traditional, foreign agency houses,
however, has not worked to the formers' advantage, especially if com-
pared to the Japanese approach of using the combination of sogo shosha
and Asian distributors, or to the preference of US companies for export-
ing through their own marketing affiliates. More importantly, European
manufacturers have not attached much importance to Southeast Asia as a
location for investment and production. This has deprived European com-Table 11 - Thai Imports by Country of Origin and Trade Channel, 1980
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Source: See Table 7.42
panies of participating in the region's economic growth in several ways:
- Firstly, the phase of import substitution or rather domestic-market
oriented industrialization behind tariff walls required overseas sup-
pliers to switch from exports of final goods to exports of intermediate
goods to affiliated production or assembly units located in the final
markets. Japanese manufacturers were most successful in this area, as
may be gathered from their substantial investment in domestic-market
oriented manufacturing units in the region as well as from the large
amount of their intermediate-goods exports.
- Secondly, the region became,, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, an
increasingly attractive low-cost production base for labour-intensive
production steps. US companies in particular, have used the region's
labour force for re-exports to the US market. This was less typical for
European manufacturers, partly because they have rather used
countries in the European periphery as low-cost production bases (see
Chapter VI below). In the 1970s, the more advanced countries in the
region evolved into full-fledged industrial export platforms for the
world market. Although some European companies have participated in
this development, Southeast Asian developing countries have not be-
come as important a low-cost production base for European companies,
as it has for US manufacturers (with the emphasis on exports to the
US) and for Japanese companies (with the emphasis on production for
the world market).
- Finally, in contrast to Japan and the US, EC investment in ASEAN
countries was concentrated not in manufacturing or mining but in
banking, and this sectoral concentration had a much smaller effect on
export expansion than investment in the primary and secondary sector
(for details, see Langhammer, GroB [1986, pp. 22-26]).
Overall, Japanese companies have been far more skillful than their com-
petitors in following the tides of economic development in Southeast Asia,
including the often dissociated development patterns in different sectors
of the same country. In practically none of the economies under review
was there a smooth transition from import-substituting to export-oriented
industrialization. Instead, industrial export orientation has generally
begun with the introduction of export incentives which co-existed with43
deeply entrenched disincentives for exports. Export processing zones in
otherwise rather inward-looking economies exemplify this situation. While
Japanese economic relations with the region have adapted to these
various developments, European companies have generally followed a
highly selective approach in their marketing strategies as well as their
economic interface with ASEAN countries in general. They have concen-
trated on final goods markets, on particular phases in economic develop-
ment, on high price segments in a given market and on a narrow range
of distribution channels. As a result, the involvement of European
companies has frequently been below the "critical mass", beyond which
crossfertilization of different projects takes place and economies of scale
amplify the impact of otherwise disconnected activities.44
IV. FDI as an Engine of Export Growth
1. The Theoretical Background
The analysis presented in Chapter III points at market presence in terms
of FDI in marketing affiliates and assembly or production subsidiaries as
key determinants for export success in ASEAN countries. Because of its
strategic nature, the relationship between FDI and exports of the home
country needs to be assessed in greater detail and in a broader context.
In order to draw policy conclusions, one has to know whether the trade
effects of FDI are common to all branches of manufacturing industries
and to all major regional markets, not just the ASEAN region. For this
reason, the subsequent analysis includes trade and investment in both
industrialized and developing countries and traces trade effects down to
the level of individual industries.
Theoretically, export expansion through FDI may accrue in at least four
different ways:
1) Foreign-affiliated companies and subsidiaries producing and selling
final goods purchase investment and intermediate goods from their
parent companies and act as intermediaries for sales of final goods
directly produced by the parent companies (intra-firm trade).
2) When investment goods or intermediate inputs are not supplied by
parent companies, foreign affiliates are likely to purchase these in-
puts rather from other suppliers in their home country with which the
parent company might have a long-standing business relationship than
from suppliers located in other industrialized countries.
3) Local investors may follow the example of foreign affiliates success-
fully opening up new markets domestically or abroad. These local imi-
tators are usually inclined to copy their model and to purchase in-
vestment and intermediate goods from the home country of successful
foreign subsidiaries.
4) The combined presence of many foreign companies from a particular
country in a specific regional market increases the awareness of con-45
sumers in this market for products from that country and helps to
establish a kind of brand consciousness, not on a company but on a
country basis.
The degree to which these considerations apply does, of course, depend
on economic policies applied in home and host countries as well as on
microeconomic determinants such as local content requirements established
by the host country, the advantages to be derived from vertically inte-
grated production processes, and last but not least, price differences
between different potential sources of supply. One would expect trade
effects of FDI to be larger in the case of sophisticated products which
offer possibilities for product differentiation and require a well-estab-
lished after-sales service, than in the case of standardized products or
raw materials with fairly uniform world market prices. Based on these
factors, the trade effects of FDI may differ substantially among host
countries and branches of manufacturing industries.
The empirical relevance of these assertions is briefly assessed in the
subsequent section and then tested in two steps. Firstly, the importance
of intra-firm trade for exports from Japan, the US and - as far as data
permit - EC member countries to markets in industrialized and developing
countries is reviewed for individual industries and related to the pattern
of FDI among host countries. And secondly, total exports of all major
home countries to various markets are related to FDI in these markets in
a multiple regression approach to determine export multipliers of FDI by
country and industry.
2. The Prima Facie Evidence
A comparison of FDI in manufacturing and manufactured exports to
ASEAN countries shows a high degree of similarity among countries and
subsectors [GroB, 1986, pp. 157-163; Tables A8, A9]. The most impor-
tant host countries for FDI have also been the most important destina-
tions of manufactured exports, and this applies to the US, Japan, West
Germany and the UK likewise. In 1984, US manufacturing FDI was con-46
Table 12 - FDI and Exports to ASEAN Countries by Country of Origin
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centrated in the Philippines and Singapore, the main markets for US
manufactured exports in the ASEAN region. Singapore has also attracted
large shares of Japanese, German, and UK FDI and has become a major
destination for manufactured exports of these countries, too. Indonesia
and Japan or Malaysia and the UK are other cases in point.
At the industry level, there seems to be a similar correlation between
FDI and the destination of exports (Table 12). US companies have mainly
invested in electrical machinery, and respective exports do in fact do-
minate total US manufactured exports to ASEAN countries in 1983. Japa-
nese FDI was geared towards establishing metal manufacturing (parti-
cularly in Indonesia) while companies from other OECD countries hardly
engaged in this activity. At the same time, Japan was the only important
supplier of exports to ASEAN countries in the category "metals and47
manufactured metals". Similar observations can be made with respect to
machinery and transport equipment.
The relationship between FDI and exports is even more pronounced if
only trade in intermediate products is considered (Table A7). The
market share of Japanese companies in intermediate goods markets is
generally higher than their shares in total trade of each sector.
However, in sectors with high Japanese FDI (chemicals, metals, trans-
port equipment) Japanese suppliers enjoy a dominating position, as do
US suppliers in the electrical machinery sector. These latter findings
seem to suggest a relatively close link between FDI and export expansion
via intra-firm trade between parent companies and foreign affiliates.
3. The Importance of Intra-Firm Trade
a. Intra-Firm Exports - A Worldwide Phenomenon
The empirical evidence of intra-firm trade has remained scanty for many
years because the statistical basis on the general level of intra-firm
trade is weak and biased in the sense that it does not provide a
representative cross section of the operations of all multinational firms,
irrespective of their home countries. The pioneering work of Helleiner
[1973; 1979a; 1979b; 1979c; 1981] on intra-firm trade is exclusively con-
fined to intra-firm imports of US multinationals during the period
1970-1977. Most of the other studies on intra-firm trade followed this line
of analysis [e.g., Lall, 1978; Casson, 1986]. In the subsequent
sections, an attempt is made to draw a truly representative picture of
the importance of intra-firm trade by combining US data with information
published by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (M-ITI) in Japanese and
some scattered evidence on the behaviour of European multinationals (for
details, see Appendix B).
Previous studies have found an important, even growing intra-firm com-
ponent in US exports and imports during the 1960s and early 1970s48
amounting to between 20 and 30 per cent of total trade [Lall, 1973,
p. 183; Chung, 1978, p. 32; Goldsbrough, 1981, p. 575]. Growing im-
portance of intra-firm exports has also been observed for UK-based and
Swedish multinationals [Goldsbrough, 1981, p. 574; Swedenborg, 1979,
p. 271]. Taking all OECD countries together, the intra-firm share in
total exports has been estimated at 20 per cent [Stein, 1984, p. 66].
Our updated and more comprehensive data (Table 13) show that these
trends have been continuing into the 1980s, and can also be found in
the exports of other home countries than the US:
- Between 1974 and 1982, the share of parent company exports (intra-
firm exports) amounted to approximately one quarter of total home
country exports for the US (1), Japan and the UK (2).
- Shares for the US and the UK seem to have followed a slightly
declining trend, whereas affiliated exports of Japanese parent com-
panies seem to have increased in relation to total Japanese exports. In
general, the overall share of one quarter has remained fairly stable.
In interpreting such results it has to be considered that they are
heavily influenced by trade in mineral fuels and some related raw ma-
terials. It is this commodity-based trade which is reported to be domi-
nated by affiliated rather than unaffiliated trade [Helleiner, Lavergne,
1979, p. 298]. As a result, the share of affiliated trade may be different
in the manufacturing sector which deserves special attention because of
its dynamics as well as of its growing importance for developing
countries' industrial development (3).
(1) The US data cited here refer to a wider base of affiliated and parent
companies, than has been previously reported in the literature, i.e.
they include the trade of US multinational enterprises with all af-
filiates, not just trade with majority-owned affiliates (MOFA's)
[Goldsbrough, 1981; Casson, 1986].
(2) For a discussion of the technical assumptions made to reconstruct
intra-firm trade data from given sources, see Appendix B.
(3) As intra-firm trade is reported according to the industry classifi-
cation of the affiliate, but not by product categories, it had to be
assumed that trade with manufacturing affiliates consisted wholly of
manufactured goods. The same assumption had been extended to
single manufacturing industries.Table 13 - Exports of Parent Companies to Foreign Affiliates in Total Home Country Exports and Industry
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At first glance, estimates of US and British manufactured intra-firm ex-
ports do not suggest differences compared to the respective intra-firm
share in total exports and its trend. Both the share and the trend in
manufactured exports are in the same range as in total exports (1).
Japan, however, deviates from this pattern. The affiliated part of its
manufactured exports is by far smaller than that of the UK and the US,
albeit considerably rising from 6.1 per cent to 12.5 per cent within
seven years (2).
Yet, the most remarkable element in shares of intra-firm trade in manu-
factured exports common to all three home countries is the wide diver-
gence in intra-firm shares between different manufacturing industries.
To mention the extremes, US exports of transport equipment had an
intra-firm share of more than 50 per cent in 1977 and still more than
40 per cent five years later, compared to industries like metals,
machinery and textiles in which affiliated exports did not exceed 10 per
cent in 1982. A similar variation between industries exists for Japan,
albeit at a lower level than in the US. As far as the data base allows for
a disaggregated analysis, similar differences emerge also for the UK and
for West Germany (3).
In all home countries, intra-firm exports are most important in the auto-
motive industry. This is essential, for it indicates that this industry has
(1) The fact that the importance of intra-firm exports of the UK seems
to be larger in manufactures than in total trade can largely be ex-
plained by the omission of oil in total trade. The intra-firm share in
total exports of petroleum companies has been estimated at 58.8 per
cent (US) and 30.0 per cent (UK) in 1977; both shares were above
average [Dunning, Pearce, 1981, p. 132).
(2) The low initial share of intra-firm exports in total Japanese exports,
and its subsequent growth, was possibly due to the fact that in-
creasingly small and medium-sized manufacturing companies set up
overseas affiliates, backed by the financial and managerial expertise
of the sogo shosha. The share of small and medium-sized parent
companies (capital of less than 100 Mill. Yen) in the total number of
sampled parents rose from 34.1 per cent (1971) to 44.1 per cent in
1976 [ MITI, a, 1977, p. 34]. Moreover, large manufacturers tended
to internalize operations which were previously left to the sogo
shosha [Tsurumi, 1976, pp. 141-147].
(3) The 1982 sample had a somewhat smaller size than the 1977 sample,
- so that the actual intra-firm shares in German exports might be
higher in 1982 than indicated in Table 13.51
some characteristics regardless of its home country origin which are con-
ducive to affiliated trade and which other industries are obviously
lacking. It also seems that a dynamic expansion of the automotive in-
dustry gives rise to shifts from unaffiliated trade to affiliated trade.
Such rising intra-firm trade shares can be observed in the case of the
Japanese and the German automotive industry in contrast to the US and
the UK, where this industry underwent serious adjustment proces-
ses (1).
The central role of the transport equipment sector in worldwide intra-
firm trade can be shown by the weight of this sector in total US, Japa-
nese and West German intra-firm manufactured exports (Table 13). In
1982, this sector comprised almost half of Japanese and of West German
intra-firm manufactured exports and more than one third of the corre-
sponding US exports. These observations indicate that industry-specific
factors determine the structural pattern of intra-firm trade, at least in
the US and Japan. Few industries (in addition to the petroleum sector)
are conducive to affiliated trade, while the majority is not. On average,
sophisticated "engineering" industries have higher intra-firm contents
than resource-based and labour-intensive industries.
b. Intra-Firm Trade with Developing Countries
The industry-specific determinants of intra-firm trade discussed above
(Section IV. 1) suggest that the relevance of this trade differs depending
on the level of development in partner countries, for sophisticated goods
are predominantly traded among high-income countries. Intra-firm trade
is assumed to be more important in North-North trade, where intra-in-
dustry specialization dominates, than in North-South trade. This hy-
pothesis has been supported by several authors who argued with respect
(1) The share of the US and the UK motor vehicle industry in total
OECD .automotive exports declined between 1976 and 1982 from 16.9
to 11.3 per cent (US) and from 6.1 to 4.5 per cent (UK). Conver-
sely, the respective shares of the Japanese automotive industry rose
from 17.1 to 25.3 per cent, and from 21.2 to 23.5 per cent in the
case of West Germany.52
Table 14 - Share of Intra-Firm Trade in Exports to Industrialized and
Developing Countries, and Regional Composition of Intra-Firm
































































































Source: OECD [e]; U.S. Dept. of Commerce [b]; MITI [a, 1974];
Sekiguchi [1979].
to US intra-firm imports that until the mid-1970s intra-firm trade has
been a phenomenon of greater, and growing, importance only for the
trade between developed countries [Helleiner, 1979a, p. 397; 1979c,
p. 163; Hill, Johns, 1985, p. 376]. Based on the evidence in Table 14
these findings of previous research can be broadened and updated:
- In the early 1980s, US exports to industrialized countries continue to
contain a much higher intra-firm element than the exports to devel-
oping countries. This holds also if the analysis is confined to manu-
facturing exports.53
- The opposite observation emerges for Japan in 1974. Intra-firm manu-
factured exports are slightly more important in exports to developing
than to developed countries. This pattern is in line with the diverging
regional distribution of Japanese and US FDI and total trade flows to
developed and developing countries.
These observations are, however, far too general to provide clues with
respect to the relationship between FDI, intra-firm trade, and export
success. Therefore, the ASEAN countries were again chosen as sample
for more detailed analysis. Data from the US benchmark surveys and the
MITI census (1) allow to establish a few stylized facts about US and
Japanese intra-firm trade with ASEAN countries (Table 15):
- US intra-firm manufactured exports are much more important for US
trade relations with ASEAN countries than with the rest of the devel-
oping world. This holds also for Japan, despite of a declining trend of
the intra-firm share in manufactured exports to ASEAN. The sectoral
composition of the intra-firm content in US and Japanese manufactured
exports to ASEAN countries on the one hand and to all developing
countries on the other hand reveals that especially in the electrical
machinery industry Japanese as well as US exporters are operating
more on an intra-firm basis in Southeast Asia than in other developing
regions. The opposite is true for US transportation equipment, as
there are virtually no intra-firm exports to ASEAN countries in con-
trast to their importance in the transport equipment exports to Latin
America or developed countries.
- In 1981, 1982 the US and the Japanese intra-firm manufactured exports
to the total ASEAN region had a similar absolute magnitude (US: 1917
US $ mill, in 1982; Japan: estimated at 1477 US $ mill, in 1981). Yet,
they accounted for sharply diverging shares of the respective total
manufactured exports. 24.4 per cent of US but only 9.6 per cent of
Japanese manufactured exports were intra-firm trade.
- With respect to past trends, the two home countries have also shown
diverging tendencies in their intra-firm export shares. The intra-firm
(1) The authors are indebted to Dr. Tran Van Tho who kindly provided
survey data on the 1980/81 sales and purchases of Japanese affiliates
in Asia.54
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Source: OECD [e]; U.S. Dept. of Commerce [b]; MITI [a, 1975];
unpublished Japanese census data; own calculations.55
content of Japanese manufactured exports declined from 13.0 to 9.6
per cent (1974-1981), while the respective US shares increased from
16.9 per cent (1977) (including only countries for which intra-firm
exports were disclosed) to 24.4 per cent (1982). If the exports of all
sectors are taken into account, the US intra-firm export ratio rose
from 14.6 to 27.7 per cent in the period under consideration.
- Irrespective of country of origin, two types of industries displayed
high intra-firm export shares in the seventies: Firstly, those which
have been either the corner-stones of export-oriented industrialization
in the ASEAN host countries (food, textiles and clothing) or recently
emerged as new export industries (electrical equipment); and,
secondly, resource-based industries with a high-technology content
(non-ferrous metals) and assembly industries with a high import
content (transport equipment). Towards the 1980s, however, remark-
able changes have taken place.
- Japanese affiliates in the traditional ASEAN export industries have
diversified their imports away from their parent companies, driving the
intra-firm export shares down. The skill-intensive production of pre-
cision instruments has shown, on the other hand, a strengthening of
intra-firm vertical ties.
- In the US case, intra-firm exports are dominated by companies produ-
cing electrical machinery. The eminent share of electrical products in
US intra-firm exports matches the dominant position of this industry
among the US export platforms in Asian developing countries [Moxon,
1984, Tables 3 and 7] and supports the hypothesis that intra-firm
trade is determined by industry-specific factors.
Since FDI is a necessary prerequisite for intra-firm trade, it is hardly
surprising that rapid growth of FDI has been accompanied with growing
intra-firm export shares (Tables 15 and A9). The manufacturing indus-
try figuring most prominently in US FDI flows (electrical equipment) also
exhibits comparatively large increases in the intra-firm export shares.
The metal industry which had the lowest FDI growth is the only industry56
with a declining importance of intra-firm exports (1). The same relation-
ship holds for Japan. Her investment in the metals and machinery indus-
tries has grown overproportionately, and so have intra-firm export
shares in these industries. Similarly, the Japanese investment in ASEAN
countries into food processing, textiles and wood products has expanded
less than average, and the intra-firm export shares of these industries
show the most dramatic declines (2).
Both US and Japanese data lend support to the hypothesis that the
intra-firm content in exports of an industry to ASEAN countries rises, if
the industry is a dynamic investor in this region. Does this also mean,
however, that intra-firm exports have contributed to the relative success
of Japanese and US suppliers on ASEAN markets? The evidence on how
changes in the intra-firm share in total exports are related to changes in
market shares is not straightforward. But there appears to be some sup-
port for the hypothesis that at least for Japanese exports the intra-firm
content in exports has grown simultaneously with Japanese gains in trade
shares in ASEAN markets. If the export performance of a specific home
country in a certain ASEAN host country market is defined as a "case",
then it emerges that in about three quarters of the Japanese cases intra-
firm exports showed more pronounced changes than total Japanese ex-
ports. This stands in marked contrast to the role of intra-firm trade for
the US economy, as in about half of the US cases, intra-firm exports
changed sluggishly in relation to overall US exports. This relation holds
with the same strength for intra-firm exports of advanced industrial
goods as for the exports of all industrial products together. Thus the
impact of intra-firm exports on total exports seems to be home country-
specific rather than industry-specific.
(1) For all US manufacturing industries the relationship between invest-
ment growth and relative intra-firm export growth is well-founded. A
rank correlation analysis of FDI growth with changes in the intra-
firm export ratios in manufacturing industries yields a correlation
coefficient of 0.62 which is statistically significant at the 5 per cent
level.
(2) Japanese direct investment growth in ASEAN countries and the
changes in the shares of intra-firm exports in total Japanese exports
to the ASEAN region were rank-correlated with a coefficient of 0.62
(significant at the 5 per cent level).57
c. Preliminary Conclusions
The evidence presented in the preceding sections confirms that FDI can
be an engine of export success by promoting intra-firm trade between
parent companies'and foreign affiliates. However, such a causal relation-
ship was observed only for a few branches of manufacturing industries
and seems to be dependent on country-specific organisational structures
of multinational companies. As a general explanation for the Japanese and
US export performance the emergence of intra-firm trade does not pro-
vide a satisfactory answer. As intra-firm trade is only one of several
channels through which FDI can promote export expansion of the home
country (Section IV. 1), a more comprehensive approach was chosen to
capture all influences FDI may have on total export flows.
4. FDI and Export Expansion - A Multiple Regression Approach
There are several studies analysing trade-creating or trade-substituting
effects of FDI [e.g. Bergsten et al., 1978; Donges, Juhl, 1979; Lipsey,
Weiss, 1981; 1984; Arnaud-Ameller, 1985]. All of them conclude that ex-
port-stimulating effects of FDI are overriding. Aside from some data
problems, these studies generally neglect the competition of investors
from several industrialized countries in individual markets. If investors
from several home countries are active in one market, this may have
negative effects on each investing country's exports to these markets as
sales promotion efforts cancel each other out and local imitators are not
necessarily forthcoming. Such influences are captured in the subsequent
regression analysis which seeks to explain the export performance of US,
Japanese, German, and UK companies in 34 markets of both industrial-
ized and developing countries depending on FDI from all four home coun-
tries considered.
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X..denotes exports in category i of home country h to country j. Inde-
*J h
pendent variables are total stocks of FDI by home country h (FDI..) and
k ^
by competing industrialized countries (FDI..) as well as gross domestic
product and per capita income of importing countries (GDP. and
GDPCAP.) as proxies for market size and level of development. FDI data
have been drawn from the sources given in Table A8; export flows are
those of OECD [e].
If trade-creating effects of FDI dominate substitution effects, the re-
gressions should yield positive export multipliers for FDI of the home
country under investigation and negative coefficients for FDI of compet-
ing industrialized countries. Both market size and level of development
are supposed to have a positive impact on the volume of exports. The
results of the regression analysis for 1983 presented in Table 16 basi-
cally confirm these expectations. Coefficients computed for total manu-
facturing and for six different branches of manufacturing industries
show statistically significant export multipliers of FDI.
For total manufacturing these multipliers are in the range of 1.5-2 for
US, Japanese, and German FDI, while FDI from the UK does not seem to
have much of an impact on UK exports. There is, however, no uniform
relationship between the size of the export multiplier and industry-
specific characteristics of individual industries. The rather global
character of the industry classification dictated by data availability is
likely to veil any such relationship. Nonetheless, there are two tenden-
cies worth mentioning:
- The first concerns research-intensive industries such as machinery and
transport equipment which generally show higher export multipliers
than less sophisticated industries such as food processing.
- The second tendency emerges from a comparison of these multipliers
with the general export performance of individual industries measured
by the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) concept [Grofi, 1986,
p. 166). In two thirds of all cases, FDI of successful export industries
had an above average impact in exports while the opposite holds for
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Source: Grofi [1986, Table 5].Table 16 also confirms the impact of competition among investors from
different countries. The presence of FDI from other industrialized coun-
tries reduces the trade-creating effects of FDI from individual home
countries in most cases, though to varying degrees depending on the
respective size of FDI. A good example is West German FDI in total
manufacturing which had .only limited export effects because of the
strong presence of Japanese and US investors whose export performance
suffered in turn from the competition of German foreign affiliated com-
panies. Applying these results to the ASEAN region, one can conclude
that German exports were not stimulated considerably by German FDI in
ASEAN countries because of the much larger engagement of Japanese and
US multinationals, but market shares of German companies would have
declined even more without FDI.
This conclusion is supported by a regression analysis based on pooled
cross section and time series data for ASEAN countries (Table 17).
Using OECD exports rather than GDP as an indicator of market size, the
coefficients for FDI match the results of the above cross section analysis
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Source: GroB [1986, Table 6].62
for a broader sample of countries. The main actors on the scene, Japan
and the US, influenced the export performance of all investing coun-
tries, while West Germany and the UK benefitted from their own FDI,
but otherwise only played a marginal role. The impact of FDI is nicely
demonstrated by comparing actual market shares (Table 2) with
hypothetical shares computed on the basis of the coefficients for total
OECD exports only. In 1983, growing import demand of ASEAN countries
alone (as reflected in total OECD exports to the region), without addi-
tional FDI, would have given Japan a market share of 37.8 per cent
which is much lower than the actual market share of roughly 41 per
cent. For all other industrialized countries, actual market shares are
below hypothetical shares due to the strong competition of Japanese
foreign affiliates.63
V. The Direction of Investment Flows from Industrialized Countries
1. The Setting
The analysis presented in Chapters III and IV as well as a substantial
body of literature (cited above) highlight the importance of FDI for suc-
cessfully penetrating foreign markets. It is unlikely that European com-
panies would use this marketing strategy for their products to a smaller
degree than their Japanese or US competitors unless there were incen-
tives to do so. The attractiveness of ASEAN markets based on low wage
costs, availability of energy and raw materials, high growth of domestic
demand, openness of the economy, rational exchange rate policies, politi-
cal and economic stability, etc., has promised high returns to all foreign
investors irrespective of their country of origin, and investment incen-
tives granted by ASEAN countries did not discriminate among investors
from different countries. When European companies have, nonetheless,
neglected this region, they may have found more profitable trade and
investment opportunities elsewhere.
The geographical distribution of stocks of FDI by country of origin and
major economic activity presented in Tables 18 and A10-A12 (1) reveals a
number of significant differences in the behaviour of multinationals from
the major industrialized countries:
- Three quarters of FDI from major industrialized home countries except
Japan were concentrated in developed countries (Table 18). FDI in
(1) Throughout this study, the evidence on FDI is based on data sup-
plied by home countries of multinationals. Although home country
data on FDI are even more scarce than respective data supplied by
host countries, the former have been preferred because host country
data - albeit being used frequently - are severely deficient. Data
supplied by the five ASEAN countries differ'with respect to defini-
tion, coverage, and time period. In particular, stock data of FDI
refer to registered or approved investment in Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Thailand. Realized investment is, however, con-
siderably lower and realization rates vary significantly among home
countries and over time. For details, see the report prepared by
Langhammer and GroB [1986, pp. 10-21]for the ASEAN/EEC High
Level Working Party on Investment.64
Table 18 - FDI in ASEAN Countries and Selected Regions by Home










































































D: Figure suppressed to avoid disclosure of .
individual enterprises.
(a) Without OPEC countries. -
(c) 1981, without oil companies































































Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan [1983]; Business Monitor [1984];
Deutsche Bundesbank [a], and unpublished data; U.S. Dept. of
Commerce [b, 1985]; own calculations.65
developing countries originating from the US and the European coun-
tries under review was rather directed towards Latin America (and a
lesser degree Africa) than to Asia. This pattern hardly changed over
time (Table A10).
- More than half of Japanese FDI was attracted by developing countries
and by Asian developing countries, in particular. Yet, the US and
Japan were the two leading investors in both the Asian and the ASEAN
region due to the vast differences in the volume of total FDI
(Table All).
- The sectoral distribution of total FDI in developing countries is rather
similar among all home countries (Table A12) with manufacturing FDI
occupying the top position. In the ASEAN region, however, manufac-
turing played a by far less important role. Japanese and US FDI was
concentrated in mining activities while banking and finance attracted
almost 40 per cent of German FDI in the region.
These observations demonstrate a different behaviour of European and
non-European investors with respect to their propensity to go overseas
as well as the sectoral and geographical allocation of their funds. The
question is whether these differences merely reflect firm-specific com-
parative advantages (such as propriety technology, patented trade
marks, managerial or marketing know-how, control on market entry,
etc.) or whether they are influenced by the economic environment facing
investors from these countries. Environmental factors such as investment
incentives granted by the home country or trade and exchange rate
policies applied in these countries may have an impact on the volume,
composition and direction of FDI by either improving or deteriorating the
competitive position of investors in specific markets vis-a-vis their rivals
from other industrialized countries. In this line of thinking, European
businessmen often complain that the Japanese superiority in Asian
markets is rather derived from excessive financial" and administrative
support granted by the Japanese government to Japanese investors than
from a superior international competitiveness of Japanese companies.
The validity of these contentions is assessed in the subsequent sections
by a critical examination of various kinds of investment incentives66
granted by Japan, the US, West Germany, and the UK. In addition to
fiscal, financial and some institutional measure promoting FDI, the
analysis also includes export promotion schemes and foreign aid as far as
these are availed by investors in connection with their production facili-
ties abroad.
2. FDI Incentives in the Home Countries
Fiscal incentives include tax privileges for income spent on or received
from FDI while financial incentives usually accrue from access to credit
at soft, i.e. subsidized, terms. A synopsis of these and other incentives
listed in two OECD surveys [a; d] is provided in Synoptical Table 2.
This overview yields some salient features (for details, see Agarwal
[1986, pp. 32-41]).
- Tax incentives do not differ much among the countries under investi-
gation. Tax laws generally attempt to avoid a discrimination between
incomes generated at home or abroad.
- The German system is most liberal among the four home countries be-
cause, in addition to allowing for crediting of taxes paid abroad
against local tax liability, it leaves the income saved on account of tax
holidays and other such incentives in host countries untaxed even in
those cases where no double taxation agreements exist to that effect
with the respective host countries.
- In the field of financial incentives Japan has the largest number of
institutions granting assistance to investors going abroad and these
incentives are available to firms of every size whereas in other home
countries such help is given primarily to smaller firms.
- The UK and the US as the traditional homes of multinational corpora-
tions appear to believe that firms willing to invest in other countries
should do so mainly on the basis of their own resources rather than on
the basis of state subsidies. Both countries hardly provide financial
incentives to their investors going abroad.67
Synoptical Table 2 - Main Incentives Available to Firms in West Germany,








1. Double taxation agreements
with 29 developing coun-
tries.
2. A tax deferment scheme
(Developing Country Tax
Law) was applicable to
FDI in LDCs up to 1981.
1. Cheaper government long-
term loans to small and
medium-size firms (2.5 per
cent for FDI in LLDCs and
3.5 per cent for-FDI in
LDCs) up to a maximum sum
of DM 2.5 mill.
2. Subsidisation of pre-in-
vestment costs,e.g.,fea-
sibility studies.









1. Guarantee of export cred-
its through official agen-
cies (Hermes and Treuar-
beit).
2. ^discounting facilities
for export financing by
a private organisation of
Commercial Banks (AKA-
Ausfuhrkredit-GmbH).
3. Subsidised export cred-
its by government owned
KfW for exports to de-
veloping countries.




1. Double taxation agreement
with 78 countries.
1. Economic aid is given to
the British foreign inves-
tors in LDCs for infra-
structure needed for their
investment projects.








2. Bilateral investment pro-
tection agreements with
host developing countries.
1. Export credit insurance by
a government agency (ECGD).
2. Cost escalation insurance
by ECGD for capital goods
with manufacturing periods
of at least two years.
3. Refinancing facilities for
export credits by banks.68







1. Tax crediting without any
double taxation agreement
on income transferred to
the US from the host
country.
1. "Direct Investment Fund"
loans are granted to small
US investors who are not
able to raise private
funds at appropriate terms.
2. Financial participation in
pre-investment costs of
projects such as reconnais-
sance survey, feasibility
studies and manpower train-
ing.
3. Loans in the form of con-
vertible and profit par-
ticipation notes but no
direct equity participa-




2. Bilateral investment pro-
tection agreements with
host developing countries.
1. Export credit insurance by
Foreign Credit Insurance
Association of about 50
insurance companies and
by EXIM of'USA.
2. Official export credit fi-




1. Double taxation agree-
ment with 13 developing
countries.
2. Tax deferment on FDI in
developing countries.





poration , Metal Mining
Agency of Japan,etc.)
grant long-term soft
loans for FDI in LDCs.
2. Subsidies for pre-in-




3. Provision of financing
for establishment of joint




2. Bilateral investment pro-
tection agreements with
host developing countries.
1. Export credit insurance
through a government agen-
cy (EID of MITI) .
2. Export credits at prefer-
ential rates by EXIM of
Japan.
3. Exchange risk insurance
by EID.
Source: OECD [a; d].69
It would be interesting to compare the relative importance of subsidised
loans and capital in FDI of the various home countries, but unfortunately
the data for this purpose are not available. Japan is, however, an ex-
ception to some extent. It publishes data not on the basis of its actual
FDI but according to projects reported to the government at preinvest-
ment stage. Therefore, Japan has information how these projects are
planned to be financed from different sources, and these data are pub-
lished [MITI, a]. If it is assumed that all the loans granted to private
foreign investors by the Japanese government are subsidised, and this
assumption seems to be quite realistic (1), then it can be said that
financial incentives have facilitated Japanese FDI considerably.
As shown in Table 19, the share of government loans in Japanese FDI
amounted to 34 per cent in 1974. Since then it has, however, gone down
to 11 per cent indicating the growing financial strength of Japanese
firms and their increasing self-confidence to establish production
facilities in other countries on their own initiative and risk. This is
supported also by the fact that Japanese investors have been financing
their FDI more and more from their own resources. The share of FDI
financed from internal liquidity of the investing firms in total FDI
increased from 33 per cent in 1974 to 63 per cent in 1982. However, in
agricultural and mining, where investment risks are relatively high and
in which the Japanese government is extraordinarily interested in pro-
moting FDI, Japanese firms have continued to take advantage of public
funds for their direct investment activities in other countries. In these
two sectors government loans account for much higher shares in total
FDI (agriculture 48 per cent and mining 39 per cent in 1982) than in
manufacturing or all sectors taken together.
Among institutional incentives, guarantees against political or non-
commercial risk are most useful for foreign investors. In all the four
countries these risks include 1) expropriation of property including na-
tionalisation and confiscation without adequate compensation, 2) war in-
(1) The grant element in loans of the Overseas Economic Cooperation
Fund (OECF), which is the most important public organisation in
Japan for giving loans and equity capital for foreign investment,
amounted to about 19 per cent in 1981 [OECF, 1982].70
Table 19 - Relative Importance of Various Sources for Financing of

























































































eluding revolution, rebellion and civil war but not a general war involv-
ing major powers of the world and 3) currency inconvertibility resulting
in impossibility or delaying of the repatriation of capital and earnings
from the host countries [OECD, a]. Equity participation, loans to
subsidiaries or firms in which the investors have equity participation and
re-invested earnings up to varying extents are guaranteed by all the
countries. Portfolio investment is insurable in Japan if it is made in the
exploitation of mineral resources to be imported into Japan under long-
term supply contracts, and in the UK if the investor has equity holding
of not less than a given minimum. In the mineral sector, portfolio invest-
ment is guaranteeable in Japan even against commercial risks like bank-
ruptcy. However, in all the four countries guarantee is given only to
new investment.71
More than half of Japanese FDI in the Third World (53 per cent) was
covered under investment guarantees in 1981 [OECD, d]. In the other
three countries comparatively fewer investors have opted for getting
their FDI in developing countries insured against non-commercial risks.
In West Germany, the proportion of insured to total FDI in the Third
World amounted in 1981 to 10 per cent and in the UK and the US only to
2 and 7 per cent respectively (1). Generally, smaller investors care more
to get their FDI insured against non-commercial risks than big multina-
tional corporations. Since they have a higher share in the Japanese FDI
(see Section V.3) they may also be responsible for the relatively higher
coverage of Japanese investment by protection guarantees.
In addition to these guarantees, all developed countries have many or-
ganisations which provide information and technical help to investors
looking for investment opportunities in the Third World. This kind of
institutional incentives is considered to be very useful for smaller in-
vestors with no or little experience in FDI. Most of the governments
have established organisations which help right from the initial stage of
finding suitable countries of location to the actual execution of produc-
tion and marketing plans. In some countries these responsibilities are
concentrated in relatively few organisations (e.g., the US) and in others
they are spread over a larger number of institutions (e.g., West Ger-
many) [OECD, d; BMZ, 1982], Japan is the only country where special
agencies are found which promote FDI in ASEAN countries (2).
Whether regionally specialised agencies of Japan are more efficient in
promoting FDI to Southeast Asia than global agencies of other countries
cannot be said a priori. What they do however indicate is that Japan has
devoted more attention to this region from the early stages of its FDI
activities than to others whereas the incentive policies and practices of
other countries have been less selective in regional allocation of their
(1) The Japanese figure is not quite comparable with the other three
because the former include probably also the credits insured against
selected commercial risks in the case of foreign companies supplying
Japan with natural resources.
(2) Three such agencies are: Japan ASEAN Investment Co., ASEAN
Finance Corporation and ASEAN Japan Development Co. [Wagner et
al., 1985].72
FDI. This must have facilitated the said concentration of Japanese in-
vestment in ASEAN countries.
As far as export incentives are concerned, it may be mentioned that the
relation between them and FDI is somewhat indirect but not less impor-
tant than in the case of direct investment incentives. Export incentives
in the developed countries usually consist of subsidised financing and
insurance against political as well as commercial risks. They are given to
promote exports of domestic goods especially of machinery and equipment
which often require longer periods of repayment. In so far as investors
satisfy their needs for capital equipment and other inputs by importing
from their home countries and finance these imports by borrowing there,
they can avail themselves of export incentives and reduce their invest-
ment risks and costs. Sometimes it may not be very difficult to take
advantage of export financing even in the case of those goods which are
bought by the investor in his home country out of his own funds to be
accounted as equity capital in his foreign firm. Many developing coun-
tries impose restrictions on transfer of funds abroad, and special permits
have to be obtained by foreign investors there for repatriation of
earnings and capital. Under such circumstances foreign investors would
naturally prefer to bring their equity share in form of capital equipment
and other importable inputs and satisfy their needs for working capital
by borrowing in local currencies on domestic markets of their host devel-
oping countries.
Although this point is difficult to prove at a general level for the four
countries under review, scattered evidence suggests that many investors
use export incentives to bolster their engagement abroad. Langhammer
[ 1986b] shows that more than 50 per cent of total FDI in Indonesian
manufacturing was implemented through imports of goods and that this
financing in kind was rather linked to the equity than the loan share of
Japanese FDI in this country. Likewise, a recent study of Indian FDI
[Agarwal, 1985] highlights that more than half of this investment was
made in the form of exports of capital equipment and other inputs which
were entitled for export subsidies. And, US $ 1.6 bill, out of 1.9 bill.
US FDI assisted by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
were tied supplies of machinery and other equipment from the US73
[UNCTC, 1983]. The true cause for this behaviour is, of course, not
the exploitation of export subsidies as such, but rather the inconver-
tibility of currencies, indigenization rules, and other restrictions on FDI
in host countries which provide incentives to foreign investors to make
their capital contributions in goods rather than in financial assets.
As far as the costs of export credit and insurance facilities in different
countries are concerned, the most important point to remember is that in
1978 an agreement called "Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Sup-
ported Export Credits" was signed by' the OECD members (excluding
Iceland and Turkey) in order to avoid undue competition among them in
granting favourable terms to their exporters. This agreement sets mini-
mum limits for interest rates and down-payments as well as maximum
limits with regard to credit maturities and local-cost financing allow-
ances, etc. Any country granting more favourable terms than stipulated
in this agreement has to notify the terms and reasons for that to other
members beforehand [OECD, a]. As a result it can be expected that the
costs of export financing in Japan, West Germany, the UK and the US
would not differ significantly from each other.
However, the ratio of export credits insured against various kinds of
risks and of those benefiting from preferential funding are substantially
higher in Japan than in other countries considered here [OECD, a]. In
1980, about 45 per cent of Japanese exports were covered by export
credit insurance. In the case of capital goods which are relatively more
important for FDI this ratio was even higher. As far as preferential
funding of export credits was concerned, most of the long-term export
credits in 1981 benefited from it. In West Germany, less than 1 per cent
of total exports was financed on preferential interest rates in 1980. In
the same year, 12 per cent of the American exports benefited from
various export incentives of which more than half was in the form of
insurance and guarantees and the remaining as preferential credits.
Again, however, it cannot be concluded that these incentives reduce the
cost of exporting risk capital from Japan more than from other home
countries. The structures of premiums for various kinds of risk insur-
ance in the case of export of both capital and goods are too compli-74
cated in the home countries to allow any generalisation on the relative
costs of such insurance in these countries. What is quite clear is that
Japanese firms have availed themselves of export and other incentives
more than the investors from the other three countries. Assuming that
the average benefit conferred by the incentives schemes of the home
countries is nearly the same or at least not significantly lower in Japan
than in other countries, it can be safely said that Japanese firms estab-
lishing production facilities in developing countries have been subsidised
through above incentives more than their counterparts from the other
countries.
Notwithstanding the above conclusion, more important questions in the
context of this study are 1) whether incentives are able to influence the
flow of FDI and 2) why Japanese multinationals have invested propor-
tionately more in ASEAN countries than the multinationals from West Ger-
many, the UK or the US. In order to answer the latter question, it is
not sufficient to have a positive answer to the first, but it has to be
further considered whether Japanese incentives were relatively higher
for ASEAN destinations (for which so far only one evidence was found
that some institutions in Japan specialise in encouraging FDI exclusively
towards ASEAN) or whether they were especially directed to FDI in this
area.
3. Effectiveness of Incentives
The literature on the effectiveness of home country incentives on outflow
of FDI is very thin (1). Generally these incentives are not found to be
very effective. In their survey of 80 investment projects in the Third
(1) Most of the literature dealing with incentives is concentrated on
those provided by host developing countries. In a very comprehen-
sive survey of studies on incentives and their effects, the Committee
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) of
the OECD [c] concluded that besides locational choices, decisions
concerning size and timing of investment may also be sensitive to
incentives. All this does not, however, imply that the incentives
offered by a country or a group of countries would attract FDI from75
World undertaken by multinationals from eight developed countries in-
cluding Japan, West Germany, the UK and the US, Reuber et. al. [1973]
concluded that the impact of many of the home country incentives seems
to be marginal at best, although they may be of some help to smaller
firms including those who have relatively limited experience in the
developing countries.
Recently, CIME concluded [OECD, c] that the economic circumstances
after 1974 have tended to render enterprises in general and multination-
als in particular more sensitive to costs and risk factors. Since incen-
tives, among other things, directly affect these factors, their impact on
investment decisions is believed to have increased, and if the competition
among governments for international investments increases, the role of
incentives in such competition would be strengthened. This was conclu-
ded by the CIME in connection with the incentives policies of the OECD
countries with regard to investments in their own economies. It seems,
however, to be applicable also to their competition for cheaper invest-
ment locations in the Third World.
Thus, two points appear to be worth noting for the present purpose.
Firstly, FDI by smaller firms is likely to be more responsive to incen-
tives. But this does not mean that the investment decisions of these
firms are determined differently than those of bigger multinational cor-
porations. They all have firstly to decide whether to invest at home or
abroad, if abroad, in a developed or developing country and then in
what form - as a subsidiary or joint venture or something else. Only
when these and a host of other such questions have been answered
leading to a final decision to go abroad, do incentives granted by home
and host countries come into the picture [BIAC, 1981].
Smaller firms generally have limited or no experience in FDI. They also
lack the means to procure reliable information about investment oppor-
tunities in other countries. Therefore their beforehand apprehensions of
risks - commercial as well as non-commercial - involved in committing
one investing country more than from others provided the incentives
are not regionally discriminatory for which there is no reason to
assume in the case of ASEAN.76
resources in production facilities in other countries, especially in the
Third World, are likely to be higher than those of bigger multinational
corporations, who are either already acquainted with investment condi-
tions in developing countries or have their own resources to get the
required informations. Under these circumstances, incentives such as the
supply of necessary information by specialised public agencies, financial
subsidies for feasibility studies and guarantees against political and
other non-commercial risks could encourage smaller investors to give up
their final doubts and invest abroad (1).
Secondly, some of the incentives (investment and export credits) tend to
lower the costs of production for producers. Therefore, the impact of
these incentives must be more pronounced in those branches of industry
which are faced with a greater cost competition and in which a relatively
larger amount of FDI has taken place primarily to take advantage of
cheaper locations in LDCs. This is most likely to be the case where
direct and indirect labour as well as environmental costs are relatively
higher because they have increased rapidly in developed countries since
the 1970s. The strong acceleration of energy costs could have
encouraged investors to seek locations in some oil-rich developing
countries.
Since both of these points apply more to the Japanese than to the
German, British or American FDI [Kojima, 1978; Franko, 1984; Berger,
Uhlmann, 1985] the incentives granted by Japan are likely to have been
relatively more effective in promoting Japanese FDI to developing coun-
tries. At least one out of every three Japanese firms engaged in FDI is
of smaller or medium size (Table A6). Though comparative data for other
countries are not readily available, there can be hardly any doubt that
this is a very high share. FDI of traditional investing countries like the
US and the UK is dominated by larger corporations and even in the case
of West Germany, which began investing overseas more or less at the
(1) A survey of German firms having FDI in Brazil, Colombia, India,
Indonesia, Mexico and Tunisia has shown, however, that firms of
medium and bigger sizes have tended to make a greater use of in-
vestment incentives than smaller firms. This may be because of a
higher representation of the firms of the former category in the
sample [ Kayser et al., 1981].77
same time as Japan, the share of bigger companies appears to be higher
[Berger, Uhlmann, 1985].
As far as the growing cost-consciousness, which may have raised the
effectiveness of incentives, is concerned, Japanese firms in labour-in-
tensive industries such as textiles, clothing, electronics, etc., started
as early as the 1960s to establish production facilities in developing
countries, especially in the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
other Southeast Asian countries, in order to overcome the rapidly rising
unit costs of labour at home (1). No doubt, firms in these branches of
other developed countries have also moved to the Third World. Some of
the German firms, for example, have created production facilities in the
neighbouring Mediterranean countries even at the cost of existing ca-
pacities at home (see Chapter VI below). But on the whole, the share of
labour-intensive branches in Japanese FDI appears to have been higher
than in the German, British or the American FDI at least in the 1970s
[Kojima, 1978; Hiemenz, 1987], and to that extent investment incentives
are likely to have been more effective in Japan. A similar corollary
exists for FDI motivated by high environmental costs at home. Density of
industrial plants in Japan is believed to be very high and it was one of
the first, if not the first, industrial countries facing severe pollution
problems resulting in costly anti-pollution regulations and thus forcing
many industries to look for less regulated and thus less costly locations
in the Third World.
In the field of natural resources Japan is more dependent on outside
resources than any other industrialized country (2). Consequently, it
grants very generous incentives for FDI in this sector in order to get a
safer access to input markets. The effectiveness of Japanese natural
(1) This applies more in the case of small and medium-sized firms as
they were harder hit by the rising costs of labour in Japan. The
bigger firms were able to attract labour relatively easily because
they could offer better working conditions [Marsh, 1983].
(2) A very high share of Japan's need for coal (82 p. c), oil
(100 p. c), natural gas (91 p. c), iron ore (99 p. c), lead
(83 p. c), zinc (69 p. c), tin (98 p. c), aluminium (100 p. c),
nickel (100 p. c), and wood and lumber (68 p. c.) has to be met
by imports [Marsh, 1983].78
resource policies including the incentives for FDI is reflected in a
comparatively high share of this sector in total FDI (Table 18) and in
undeterred economic growth of the Japanese economy in spite of the two
oil crises in the 1970s.
Thus, the Japanese incentives may have been more effective in promoting
FDI than those of West Germany, the UK and the US. According to
Ozawa [1979], the majority of Japanese firms were too immature in size,
technological sophistication and financial strength to undertake FDI on
their own, and they have been able to do so only as a result of financial
and managerial support mobilized by the government. Nevertheless, the
discussion so far does not show why Japan commands a higher share of
total FDI in the ASEAN countries which is the main point of discussion
in this chapter. Incentives in Japan, as anywhere else too, are available
for FDI in all developing countries and not exclusively for ASEAN coun-
tries. Therefore, it has to be examined whether these countries enjoy a
privileged position in the implementation of incentive policies in Japan.
However, this cannot be discovered from the Japanese incentive schemes,
and empirical data on the regional distribution of financial subsidies,
etc., which would enable the discovery of a regional bias, are not avail-
able. But there are statistics on regional distribution of Japanese eco-
nomic aid. Aid can be - as shown in the following section - an important
stimulator of FDI. In addition to that, its regional distribution may also
reflect the geographical bias of a donor country in granting investment
incentives because, firstly, the decision-making authorities in both cases
may often be the same and, secondly, some of the costs of investment
incentives are included in economic aid, at least in Japan. Therefore,
the analysis of economic aid in the following section should not only
enable the discovery of the relation between aid and FDI of donor coun-
tries but also to indicate whether any particular region, viz. ASEAN,
enjoyed a privileged position in the implementation of incentives schemes
by the home countries.79
4. Economic Aid and FDI
The hypothesis tested here envisages that economic aid stimulates FDI of
the donor country into the aid-receiving country. There are several
factors which suggest a positive and not a negative relation between
these two variables [Dudley, Montmarquette, 1976]. Firstly, some of the
constituents of bilateral aid (viz., grants for pre-investment studies,
financing of some of .the infrastructure required by the firms of donor
countries in their host nations, subsidies involved in fiscal and financial
incentives and some of the institutional costs for promoting FDI in devel-
oping countries) are directly associated with FDI of donor countries.
Secondly, bilateral aid is executed partly by private firms of donor
countries and the economic relations emerging between these firms and
aid-receiving countries may lead to FDI of these firms in such countries.
Finally, bilateral aid is mostly an indicator of good political relations
between donor and recipient countries, which are necessary also for a
smooth flow of private investment from the former into the latter. Aid
has proved, besides other factors, an important determinant of FDI in
some of the studies based on the data of recipient countries. Reuber
et al. [1973], for example, came to the conclusion that there was a
strong positive correlation between FDI and aid received by the coun-
tries included in his cross-sectional analysis. A very comprehensive
treatment is given to this question in a recent study by Schneider and
Frey [ 1985]. Bilateral official aid of the Western countries is found by
them to have a strong stimulating effect on FDI in host developing
countries.
In order to test the above hypothesis, FDI of the four donor countries
Japan, West Germany, US, and UK were simultaneously regressed on
their net official bilateral aid to the host developing countries and on
per capita income as well as population of these countries. The focus of
attention is on the relation between FDI and aid. But since FDI is
usually determined also by basic economic conditions prevailing in host
countries, the latter two variables are included in the equation. They
represent the demand side in the host countries and are expected to
have a positive relation to FDI.80
Table 20 - Regression Results on FDI and Foreign Aid for Japan, West













































(W. Germany) (0.02) (1.76) (0.96) (F = 1.34)
FDI1983 = 922 - 0.073 X1 + 0.19 X2 + 2.38 X3 R
2= 0.005 n = 32
(USA) (0.4) (0.99) (0.79) (F = 0.44)
FDI1QQn = 143 - 0.08 X.. + 0.04 Xo + 1.20 X_. R
2= 0.02 n = 35
(UK) (0.30) (1.11) (1.18) (F = 1.30)
FDI: Foreign direct investment on cumunative basis.
X.: CDA = Total net official bilateral development assistance on cumu-
lative basis. For Japan, data were cumulated from 1960 to 1983
(fiscal year 1982/83) and for the UK from 1960 to 1981. For both
of them, figures for 1968 are not included due to their unavail-
ability. For West Germany, data refer to 1950-1984 and for the US
from 1946 to 1983.
X.: Gross domestic product per capita in 1982.
XJ: Population in respective years.
(a) Only those developing countries are included in the estimastes
which have total FDI and ODA of not less than US $ 10 mill, in the case
of Japan and the UK, DM 10 mill, in West Germany and US $ 100 mill, in
the case of the US. - *,** = statistically significant at the 1 and
2 per cent level, respectively; two-tailed test; t-values are given in
parentheses.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan [1981; 1983]; OECD [b]; British
Business [1984]; U.S. Dept. of Commerce [a, 1984, pp. 24-27];
USAID [1984]; BMWi [var. iss.]; BMZ [1985]; UNCTAD [1985];
IMF [1986].
Except in the case of Japan, the aid hypothesis is rejected by the re-
gression estimates (Table 20). For Japan, the aid coefficient is positive
and highly significant whereas for the other three donor countries it is
statistically insignificant. Japan is famous for having used its aid for
encouraging FDI [Marsh, 1983], especially in big projects in the field of
natural resources such as, e.g., the Asahan Hydroelectric and Alumi-
nium Project in Indonesia [Ozawa, 1980]. The methods applied in this
case have come to be known as Asahan formula according to which one
or more of Japanese firms first look for an investment opportunity in a
country whose natural resources (Indonesia, Brazil) or location (Singa-81
pore) are of great importance for them and Japan. The conceived project
is usually very large so that its importance for the economy of the host
country is quite obvious. Then the host government is approached to
give it a national character, and to request the Japanese government to
give aid for financing the project. Meanwhile, the initiating Japanese
firms try to seek co-operation of other firms in Japan for forming a big
consortium representing various kinds of interests which may be able to
make a noticeable impact on the Japanese government. If the Japanese
aid is not forthcoming, the host government approaches some other
country or countries for aid, and the Japanese firms then finally succeed
in pressurising their government to support the project and not to let it
go to other countries. This is not to deny that other countries have also
used their economic aid to support their private investments in the Third
World. But the weight of such cases in German, British or American aid
is not likely to be as heavy as in the Japanese aid.
The analysis of the regional distribution of aid of the four donor
countries shows that ASEAN has enjoyed a very high regional priority in
Japanese economic aid. In any case, it is far higher than the priority
given to it by the other three donor countries. It receives about one
third of total Japanese bilateral aid compared with its very low shares of
about five per cent in the German, British and American aid (Table 21).
Surprisingly, ASEAN has received nearly as much aid in terms of shares
as FDI from Japan. As compared to this, West Germany has given more
aid to ASEAN than FDI there and the UK as well as the US have in-
vested in ASEAN more than what they have contributed to this region as
bilateral economic aid. Within this region, Japanese aid and FDI are both
concentrated in Indonesia. West Germany has invested relatively more in
Singapore than in other countries of this region but granted relatively
more bilateral aid to Indonesia. The British FDI is concentrated in the
Commonwealth member countries of Malaysia and Singapore, but the aid
appears to be more equally distributed among all the countries.
On the basis of the assumption made earlier that governments in home
countries are likely to follow similar regional preferences in granting
investment incentives as in giving economic aid and in light of the find-
ings on the relation between aid and investment, it may now be con-82
Table 21 - Share of ASEAN Countries in Total Gross ODA and Total FDI






































































































































Source: OECD [b]; Sekiguchi [1982]; Table All; own calculations.
eluded that Japan has successfully promoted more of its FDI to ASEAN
than the other countries. The relatively strong position of US investors
in the region indicates, however, that incentives do not play a decisive
role in investment decisions. It would be a mistake to conclude that the
role of economic aid in promoting FDI should be strengthened in other
donor countries to match the Japanese efforts and success in the ASEAN
region. Rather, attempts to promote FDI should be directed especially at
improving the access of smaller and medium-size firms to comprehensive
and reliable information about investment opportunities in ASEAN as well
as in other developing countries and to capital markets in the home
countries where they are likely to search first for funds for financing83
their investment requirements abroad. Borrowing capability of firms for
investments in a particular region depends also on creditworthiness of
this region on the respective capital markets. Southeast Asian countries
did not enjoy a high rating vis-a-vis the Latin American nations on the
Western capital markets in the 1970s. So it is not surprising that the
former received a relatively smaller share of FDI of the Western firms.
The standing of this region has, however, improved in the 1980s.84
VI. EC - FDI and European Economic Integration
1. The EC as a Special Case
The evaluation of investment incentives has established some policy-in-
duced reasons for the superior presence of Japanese companies in ASEAN
countries, but has not succeeded in explaining the different attitude of
European and US firms towards various regional markets. The neglect of
developing and, more specifically, ASEAN countries (Table All) suggests
that there are additional incentives influencing investment decisions of
European and, in particular, EC suppliers. To trace major determinants
of this decision-making process, the alternatives open to EC companies
have to be assessed and reasons for actual choices pinpointed.
EC-based firms can select among some options for production and invest-
ment which are not open in a similar way to non-EC-based companies. In
addition to the general alternatives of either producing at home and ex-
porting directly to other countries or investing abroad for re-import and
export to third countries, EC suppliers can
- invest in other EC countries and particularly in backward regions of
the Community where labour is relatively abundant and cheap, and
make use of the free trade and free mobility provisions of the EC;
- engage in the new member countries of the EC, that is Spain, Portugal
and Greece, as well as in other Mediterranean countries which are
linked to the EC through preferential trading arrangements and which
therefore enjoy a privileged market access; and
- establish production facilities in socialist European countries or ne-
gotiate subcontracts with local producers in these countries which are
connected to individual EC member countries by government treaties.
The subsequent sections focus on the extent to which these alternatives
have been pursued by EC companies, the economic policy determinants
for the respective choices made and the impact of production and invest-
ment decisions on trade flows.85
2. Producing at Home or Investing Abroad?
Each company operating in international markets has to make two sets of
decisions concerning production and sales activities which are, of
course, interrelated. Firstly, management has to optimize the volume and
distribution of production activities among actual or potential locations of
plants, i.e., the amount of output to be produced at home or abroad.
Secondly, it has to decide on the amount of output to be sold at home or
exported to foreign markets from both domestic plants and foreign af-
filiates.
There are several indicators available (1) which allow to assess whether
EC firms
- have a higher propensity to produce at home than US or Japanese
firms (Table 22);
- are more domestic market-oriented than their competitors in the US and
Japan (Table 23);
- tend to supply their export markets more by direct exports from
parent companies than by sales through foreign affiliates compared to
the other suppliers (Table 23).
On average, i.e., for all industries, the ratios of domestic to total pro-
duction presented in Table 22 yield a very high propensity of Japanese
firms to produce at home and a rather low propensity of UK firms to do
so. US and French firms appear to be in between the two poles, whereas
West German firms also seem to prefer home production. For "total Eu-
rope" (including European firms based in non-EC countries), home pro-
duction ratios are smaller compared to most individual EC countries. This
result may indicate a relatively large attractiveness of home production
within an EC market which has become more integrated over time.
(1) The indicators presented in Tables 22 and 23 are derived from so-
called overseas production ratios, overseas sales ratios and overseas
market sourcing ratios collected by Dunning and Pearce [ 1981; 1985]
for the world's largest industrial enterprises. The results are hence
biased in favour of large firms and do not consider the market af-
filiation of small and medium-sized firms which were reported to be
important overseas producers, especially in the Japanese case
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of parent company sales in
Source: Dunning, Pearce [1981, Table 6.1 (a); 1985, Table 7.1. (a)]; own calculations.87
Table 23 - Home Country and Direct Export Orientation of US, European
and Japanese Firms, 1977 and 1982 (per cent)























































(a) Sales of the parent company in the horns
centage of total worldwide sales.
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- (b) Parent company exports as a
affiliates and associated companies
the proportion of the firm's; total
foreign market supply accounted for by direct exports from the home
country.
Source: Dunning, Pearce [1981, Tables 6.3 and 6.-4; 1985,
and 7.4]; own calculations.
Tables 7.3
This general pattern also holds for subsectors disaggregated by their
research intensity. One would assume that low research-intensive indus-
tries would show lower home production propensities because of their
large unskilled labour and raw material absorption and the availability of88
these inputs abroad, in particular in developing countries. However, the
evidence does not support this assumption. Home production propensities
vary considerably among low research-intensive industries and countries.
They sometimes even exceed the average of home production propensities
for total manufacturing. Protectionism (textiles), large, fully integrated
domestic markets open for mass production (US), and the importance of
non-traded goods in low research-intensive industries (beverages,
publishing, printing, building materials) may explain relatively high pro-
pensities to produce labour-intensive and raw material-intensive goods
rather at home than abroad. On the other hand, high research-intensive
goods are often produced by leading innovators with affiliates scattered
all over the industrialized world which supply export markets. Such de-
centralized production activities tend to reduce propensities to produce
at home.
Producing at home is, however, not equivalent to domestic-market orien-
tation. The latter indicator (Table 23, top half) shows for the majority
of multinationals that sales of the parent company in the home country
market cover only a smaller part of their worldwide sales than home
country production, and that this part has been generally declining
further in 1977-1982. Again, Japanese firms seem to be relatively domes-
tic market-oriented, especially in low research-intensive industries, while
the opposite applies to European firms which in high research-intensive
industries sold about two thirds of their total output outside the local
market. An above average outward-orientation of European firms is ap-
parent in all major industries, though it is more pronounced in high
research-intensive than in low research-intensive industries. This can
hardly be surprising since companies based in European countries with
small domestic markets have to be more outward-oriented than firms
based in the large, integrated US market. However, the outward orien-
tation of European companies rather reflects large intra-EC trade and
investment flows than a similar overseas engagement of these companies
[Dunning, Pearce, 1985, p. 135].
Both indicators, sales orientation and propensity to produce at home,
seem to contradict the hypothesis that European companies owe their
losses in world trade to a lack of own foreign affiliates and to excessive89
domestic market-orientation. A comparison with large Japanese firms
would even suggest the contrary: in 1977-1982, European companies have
produced relatively less at home and sold more on foreign markets than
Japanese and US firms. Outward-orientation as such is, however, a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for sustained international
competitiveness. What matters, too, according to the analysis of inter-
national marketing strategies provided in Chapters III and IV is the
presence in foreign markets through foreign investment.
The two indicators presented so far cannot determine the weight of
parent company exports relative to sales -of foreign affiliates, i.e.,
whether export markets of the European, Japanese and US firms are
supplied more by direct exports of the parent companies or by sales of
foreign affiliates. This information is provided by the third indicator,
namely the share of parent company exports in total sales in foreign
markets (Table 23, bottom half). It is this share of direct exports in
foreign market supply which reveals the most striking differences be-
tween the US, Europe, and Japan in that order. US firms supply foreign
markets by more than 80 per cent through sales of own affilates abroad,
while Japanese firms have relied to almost the same extent on parent
company exports to penetrate these markets. The strategy of European
companies is less clear-cut. UK firms show a pattern of foreign market
supply similar to the US, i.e., a high amount of overseas production,
whereas France and West Gemany take an intermediate position with
direct exports and overseas production fairly split.
Looking at all European companies, the sales pattern is characterized by
an increasing share of own affiliates in the supply of low research-in-
tensive goods to foreign markets and by increasing proportions of direct
exports in high research-intensive goods. In sum, the sales pattern of
European firms seems to resemble more the US than the Japanese type.
Sizeable differences exist between the UK, on the one hand, which dis-
poses of a relatively large stock of foreign affiliates, and continental
Europe, on the other, where the propensity to export directly from
parent companies is more pronounced. Yet, these indicators do not
provide sufficient evidence on the actual marketing strategies of multi-
national corporations from different countries since they fail to distin-90
Table 24 - Share of EC and Developed Countries in FDI of Major EC









































Stock data at year end
Stock dada at year end
Stock data at year end
Net flow data from the
balance of payments.
Cumulated net flow data
Net flow data from the
balance of payments
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [b]; British Business [1984]; De Neder-
landsche Bank [var. iss.]; Ministere de l'economie, des finances
et du budget [var. iss.]; Nezeys [1984]; Banca d'ltalia [1984].
guish between markets in developed and developing countries. If the
earlier hypothesis about "fortress Europe" is correct, intra-EC trade and
investment flows are likely to dominate total flows. The importance of
this distinction between destinations in developed and developing coun-
tries is demonstrated both with respect to FDI and trade in Tables 24
and 25.
Table 24 shows the shares of EC and industrialized countries in total FDI
of companies based in selected EC member states. The scattered and not
strictly comparable evidence suggests that the EC was a major destina-
tion for investment of EC-based companies, but this destination has
rather become less attractive over time.
In fact, the share of the EC in total foreign investment of those three
member countries publishing stock data declined during the late 1970s
while other developed countries, mainly the US, could maintain their91
Table 25 - Share of Intra-EC Trade in Total Non-Fuel Exports of EC






















































position as host countries of the EC-based firms or even improve it. For
France, flow data display the same trend.
Obviously, the process of economic integration within the EC has eroded
incentives to invest in member states in order to circumvent trade bar-
riers against direct exports. In other words, the removal of intra-EC
trade obstacles raised the relative attractiveness of direct exports com-
pared to investment because harmonization of investment legislation and
free capital movement could not keep pace with the liberalization of trade
between EC member states. Trade orientation towards member countries
reached its peak by 1980 when almost 53 per cent of total non-fuel ex-
ports of EC member countries went to other partner countries in the
Community (Table 25). Countries like the Benelux states or Ireland even
shipped up to three quarters of their exports to other member states.
During the first half of the 1980s, however, intra-EC trade slightly
declined relative to trade with other developed countries, mainly North
America, but intra-EC trade still accounted for more than 50 per cent of92
total EC trade in 1985. There is little doubt that the accession of Spain
and Portugal to the EC will reinforce this direct export orientation
towards member states. If EC exports to the remaining countries of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are added to intra-EC trade
(1), European market economies have been the destination for almost two
thirds of total EC exports in the past decade.
Such a strong trade orientation towards Europe of course reflects the
ongoing process of economic integration supported by geographical prox-
imity and lacking communication barriers. Post-war Europe has in fact
developed a pattern of inter-country specialization which flourished be-
cause of income similarities. While such similarities may explain the in-
tensity of trade relations (Linder trade) they do not determine the prod-
uct composition of trade. In this respect intra-European trade gained
further attractiveness since the high income level of most partners stim-
ulated the emergence of intra-industry specialization instead of inter-
industry specialization, a typical feature of trade between countries at
different income levels (Heckscher-Ohlin-trade) (2). Differences between
the two patterns of specialization are especially relevant with regard to
their vulnerability against protectionist tendencies. Inter-industry spe-
cialization may threaten the further existence of industries and thus pro-
vokes industry-specific coalitions of both employers and trade unions
against import liberalization. Intra-industry specialization opens two-way
trade options and provides export outlets for industries under import
competition. These advantages of intra-industry specialization have not
only accelerated growth of intra-European trade, but also introduced a
clear policy bias against extra-European trade. Trade liberalization be-
tween the EFTA and the EC, for instance, never provoked such in-
dustry-specific protectionist pressures as did the liberalization of imports
from low-income countries outside Europe.
(1) Free trade arrangements in industrial goods between EFTA countries
and the EC provide similar access conditions for EC-EFTA trade in
manufactures compared to intra-EC trade.
(2) Various studies have suggested the high degree of intra-industry
specialization that accompanied the European integration process
[Balassa, 1966; Finger, Kreinin, 1979].93
As a result, European economic integration gave rise to the said "for-
tress Europe" perceptions of both managers and,politicians. The strategy
was to exploit the potential of intra-European trade fully before pene-
trating into new export markets abroad. The statistical evidence of
slightly decreasing intra-EC trade shares in the early 1980s (Table 25)
does not contradict this view. It was mainly the North American market
which became more open because of the real appreciation of the US cur-
rency, as well as some "captured" markets of Mediterranean and African
countries associated with the EC which gained shares in EC trade, but
not markets in Latin American or" Asian developing countries.
These observations lead to important conclusions. EC suppliers are not
domestic-market oriented if this market is defined as national market,
but they have acquired an intra-EC orientation (including countries as-
sociated with the EC) or - at best - an intra-European orientation.
There are a number of reasons some of which have already been
mentioned why it may have been attractive for EC suppliers to narrow
their production and sales activities to Europe. One such reason is the
potential for intra-industry specialization among high-income partners.
Another stems from the removal of trade barriers in Europe which have
promoted intra-EC and intra-European trade as a substitute to intra-
regional investment and partly replaced imports from third countries by
local European imports (trade diversion). And finally, there were other
incentives for the inward-orientation of EC companies which are related
to distributional policies of the Community and the geographical proximity
of socialist countries with special trade policy relationships to EC member
states.
3. Investing in Backward Regions of the EC
Economic integration in Europe has not only favoured intra-EC trade at
the expense of third country trade, but also stimulated direct exports
rather than intra-EC investment, as stated above. The latter finding
does, however, require an important qualification. While European loca-
tions have lost shares in total investment flows, the European integration94
has nonetheless provided new safety nets for industries under competi-
tion from low cost suppliers from the Third World. One such protected
pocket for traditional industries has emerged from regional policies within
the EC and another from the EC association of some Mediterranean and
overseas (mainly African) developing countries.
The EC integration has aimed at reconciling allocational and distributional
targets. In particular, agglomeration tendencies that could arise as a
result of liberalizing intra-EC trade should be mitigated by regional poli-
cies in favour of backward areas. Both the EC Commission as well as
national governments provide regional subsidies which are expected to
make backward areas within the EC more attractive for private invest-
ment. Economically, regional subsidies are equivalent to interventions in
factor price ratios between the periphery and agglomeration areas. They
lower the cost of the scarce factor in backward regions, that is human
and physical capital relative to unskilled labour, and may result in
stimulating demand for the complementary factor, labour. Private invest-
ment absorbing unskilled labour in backward areas of the EC competes
directly with investment in third countries where a similar abundance of
unskilled labour prevails. Other determinants of investment being equal,
public interventions in relative factor prices through EC regional sub-
sidies can therefore negatively affect investment in developing countries
outside the Community. This holds in particular if labour-intensive seg-
ments of production processes are shifted to backward areas in the Com-
munity and processed parts can be re-exported free of border restric-
tions as is the case within the EC but not for third countries.
Whether regional subsidies granted by the EC have in fact been instru-
mental in directing FDI to backward EC areas instead of developing
countries is difficult to prove empirically. The interdependence of
numerous investment criteria and motives as well as lacking information
on the degree of substitutability between potential investment projects
render it impossible to determine what would have happened without the
regional subsidies. Since grants and loans provided by six different EC
sources of regional funds (1) are sizeable, it seems justified, however,
(1) European Regional Development Fund, the European Investment
Bank, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, the95
to assume a less than marginal impact of these subsidies on investment
flows, and anecdotal evidence seems to point in the same direction.
A major beneficiary of regional subsidies was Ireland (1). In 1983, the
total amount of the Community's financial participation in investment in
Ireland amounted to ECU 2048 mill. (2) (about US $ 1.7. bill.), i.e.,
about 45 per cent of Ireland's gross fixed capital formation in the same
year. There is evidence that Ireland has increasingly attracted invest-
ment from other EC member states. In 1976-1984, the stock of West
German investment in Ireland grew by about 15 per cent annually,
whereas investment in the EC as a whole grew by about 12 per cent. In
shares, however, Ireland has remained a minor host for German invest-
ment in the EC (less than two per cent).
A second clue can be derived from the observation that during the last
decade labour-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing and
especially parts of electrical consumer goods which strongly compete with
imports from developing countries have been established in the periphery
of the Community. Again, the Irish example is illustrative. Ireland has
become one of the two EC member states which extensively apply for
national escape clauses against textile imports from developing countries
(Art. 115 EEC Treaty) (3). The application of such clauses means that
the common protection level against third country imports can be tempo-
rarily exceeded by the member state and that border controls against
European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy
Community and the so-called New Community Instrument.
(1) Ireland is the only EC member state which as a whole is defined as
receiver of EC regional subsidies. Other member states which com-
prise both backward and agglomeration areas can therefore not be
taken as reference cases for investment inflows because such flows
cannot be attributed to either area.
(2) The figures are total investment costs for projects benefiting from
the Community's financial contributions. This of course is not
equivalent to the benefits in economic terms, which would be the
grant element, that is the amount saved compared to the situation
where the funds had been borrowed on the private capital market at
market terms. See for a detailed statistical breakdown of EC regional
subsidies [EUROSTAT, c].
(3) France is the other member state. Both countries account for about
80 per cent of all national escape clauses applied, for instance,
against Asian developing countries during the 1981-1985 period
[Langhammer, 1986a, Table 7].96
indirect imports via other member states strictly limit the volume of
textile imports in Ireland. As Ireland has begun to invoke Art. 115 EEC
Treaty frequently only since the early 1980s, this suggests that some
newly installed capacity in textile production would become obsolete with-
out additional protection. It is rather likely that capital invested in this
labour-intensive industry does not only originate from national sources
but also from companies in other EC member states which were attracted
by favourable investment allowances.
With Greece, Spain and Portugal as new members, regional subsidies are
likely to gain in importance in the future. Given the already relatively
high amount of EC investment in these countries, more regional subsidies
for the Southern part of the Community could easily promote an
enlarging flow of investment to this region, especially since free access
to Spanish and Portuguese markets will still be restricted during the
first years of membership.
4. Investing in Associated Non-Member Countries
EC companies considering the relocation of parts of their production pro-
cesses cannot only shift capital to backward regions within the EC, but
also to neighbouring countries of the Mediterranean basin associated with
the EC. All Mediterranean countries (including Yugoslavia, but with the
exception of Libya) have negotiated preferential trading arrangements or
even free trade agreements with the Community. Textile exports of Medi-
terranean countries to the Community are still subject to restrictions
under the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), but have been granted higher
ceilings for annual increases than MFA exports from other developing
countries. Further advantages accrue from less restrictive regulations
for clothing exported for outward processing if EC firms are involved.
Furthermore, the privilege to control that textile exports would not be-
come "disruptive" has basically been passed from the importing EC coun-97
tries to the authorities of the Mediterranean countries themselves (1).
Such a relatively loose form of trade surveillance was intended to con-
form formally with the MFA trading arrangements, but has in fact pro-
vided further scope for circumventing the worst consequences of the
MFA restrictions. Finally, the proximity to the EC market - in terms of
relatively low information costs - has provided an additional advantage to
Mediterranean countries vis-a-vis potential host countries in developing
Asia.
A comparison of growth rates of EC investment in the Mediterranean
basin with investment in all developing countries reveals that, e.g.,
West German investment grew slightly faster in the former than in the
latter area (1976-1984: 14 per cent annually and 12 per cent, respec-
tively). However, investment figures cannot reveal the whole extent of
business relationships between EC firms and Mediterranean countries
since outward processing accounts for a sizeable proportion of trade.
Outward processing does not necessarily require equity participation of
EC suppliers in local firms (as the case of Yugoslavia shows, which is
the most important partner for this activity in the Mediterranean basin).
Yet, equity participation seems to be common in Tunisia, the second most
important Mediterranean partner in outward processing for French,
German, Dutch and Belgian firms [Joekes, 1982, pp. 105 f.].
Since the EC collects information on exports for outward processing,
some insights can be gained as to the significance of this division of
labour for countries in the Mediterranean basin and elsewhere
(Table 26). In 1982, Mediterranean countries absorbed about 47 per cent
of total EC clothing exports for outward processing, and this percentage
increased to almost two thirds three years later. In fact, the over-
whelming part of outward processing in clothing was made in the vicinity
of the EC, both in the Mediterranean region and European socialist coun-
tries which received another 30 per cent share of EC clothing exports
for outward processing in 198-5. Overseas developing countries in Asia
and Latin America have only negligibly participated in this international
(1) For the treatment of Mediterranean countries in the EC trade policy
for textiles, see Joekes [1982].98
Table 26 - EC Exports under Outward Processing Regimes in Clothing
































































Source: EUROSTAT [b]; own calculations.
division of labour with the EC as demonstrated by the less than 1 per
cent share of ASEAN countries.
These observations cannot be generalized, though. Outward processing
does not only take a place in neighbouring countries. The choice of
partners is industry-specific rather than country-specific. The other
major industry in which outward processing is important, electronics,
reveals a completely different regional pattern of EC exports (Table 26).
Mediterranean countries have not attracted outward processing of elec-
tronics to a considerable extent, nor have European socialist countries.
Roughly 40 per cent of exports for outward processing of electronics
commissioned by EC firms were directed to ASEAN countries in 1985,
with Singapore receiving the lion's share.99
Such distinct differences of regional patterns between two industries
suggest that neither lacking information nor geographical remoteness
constitute serious locational disadvantages for ASEAN vis-a-vis other
developing countries which are in the neighbourhood of the Community.
The ultimate choice of locations for outward processing rather depends
on institutional factors giving a competitive edge to one area over the
other. The discriminatory treatment of developing countries with respect
to market access in the EC constitutes one of these factors. Such dis-
crimination clearly exists in textiles where Mediterranean countries enjoy
a privileged market access compared to all Asian countries, but a similar
discrimination does not apply to trade in electronics.
A further institutional factor which is likely to gain in importance in the
future is the EC support granted to Mediterranean countries through
development aid which is to promote industrialization in recipient coun-
tries. EC development aid for the Mediterranean countries could become
more readily available as a compensation for the loss of agricultural ex-
port markets in the EC when Portugal and Spain are fully integrated into
the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC and replace Mediterranean sub-
stitutes. If the inflow of aid succeeds in promoting industrialization in
Mediterranean countries and if these countries support the establishment
of export-oriented industries by appropriate incentives, this region will
become even more attractive for investors from EC countries which want
to make use of the preferential access of this region to industrial
markets in the EC.
5. Outward Processing in European Socialist Countries
As Table 26 suggests, European socialist countries are the second
largest group of countries which process clothing on behalf of EC firms
for re-exports to the Community. This importance is not reflected in
investment statistics of EC countries which indicate only tiny shares of100
socialist countries in total FDI (1). Obviously, state-owned firms in so-
cialist countries produce for European markets without equity links to
European companies.
There are four major characteristics of East European-EC economic rela-
tions which have a direct bearing on EC economic relations with devel-
oping countries. One is the complementarity of factor endowments of both
areas. Socialist countries supply either resource-intensive or labour-in-
tensive goods as most developing countries do. The prices of these
goods do, however, not necessarily reflect production costs but rather
the aim of socialist governments to earn foreign exchange. Administrative
price fixing independent of actual factor costs is a major reason for the
keen competition of European and developing countries on EC markets.
At times, supply bottlenecks in socialist countries may erode their price
advantages thus hampering the export performance of these countries
more than the protectionist trade policy of the EC does [ Yannopoulos,
1985]. However, such bottlenecks may also arise in some developing
countries and therefore do not constitute a permanent disadvantage of
socialist countries.
Secondly, the political stability of socialist countries guarantees the
economic survival of the socialist partners in outward processing ac-
tivities and thus reduces costs of uncertainty for Western producers or
traders. Political risks of expropriation do not exist.
The third important element characterizing business relationships with
European socialist countries is bilateralism and the role of governmental
agreements as an indispensable prerequisite for trade and capital trans-
actions. The common umbrella of these agreements is industrial co-opera-
tion (2). This co-operation includes a wide range of contractual commit-
ments for trade and production, such as
(1) For instance, West German investment in European socialist countries
amounted to only 0.03 per cent of total FDI in 1984. Figures for
other EC members, if available, are in the same range.
(2) It has been estimated that by 1980 20 per cent of the growth of
East-West trade was due to industrial co-operation agreements [UN,
c, 1980, pp. 80 f.]. - See for a more detailed analysis of the
various forms of co-operation UN [c, 1981; 1982].101
- compensation arrangements which stipulate the acquisition of plants and
equipment based on loans of Western suppliers and the reimbursement
of these loans through buy-back arrangements;




- co-production, specialization and co-operation based on a functional
division of tasks among Eastern and Western partners;
- marketing arrangements;
- "tripartite" co-operation contracts for projects carried out in third
countries, predominantly in Mediterranean countries;
- reciprocal trading arrangements.^
Fourthly, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) enjoys a politically
rooted duty-free access to the West German market and hence indirectly
- as the customs union principle applies - also to other EC member coun-
tries. The fact that such a de facto customs union between the two Ger-
man states could encourage the outward processing of textiles in the
GDR which are then re-exported to EC member states, particularly to
France, has given cause for concern [ Conseil Economique et Social,
1982, p. 242].
In the manufacturing sector, industrial co-operation arrangements have
mostly covered automotive and chemical industries, but also light indus-
tries such as clothing and footwear. Again, there is only scattered evi-
dence on the impact of such contractual commitments on East-West trad-
ing relations. The UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has esti-
mated that in 1977 the four major Western trading partners (France,
West Germany, Italy and Japan) have supplied somewhere between 13 and
39 per cent of their capital goods exports to East European countries
under compensation agreements and that the USSR bought between 16
and 47 per cent of their capital goods imports from Western countries
under such agreements [UN, c, 1981, p. 11]. In another study, large-
scale product buy-back agreements were reported to have covered 15 per102
cent of West German trade with the USSR at the end of the 1970s
[Altmann, 1979].
Bilateralism and the heavy interference of statal and para-statal agencies
in private business on both the EC and the East European side con-
stitute a preferential element of EC-East economic relations compared to
EC-South relations. This preferential element can be described as as-
sured access to output and input markets in socialist countries, lack of
uncertainty with respect to political stability to the widest possible ex-
tent, risk-sharing of public agencies, and a lack of competitive pressure
once the agreements are signed. However, only about six per cent of
total extra-EC exports have been directed to the socialist countries up to
now. This indicates that there are severe obstacles against the penetra-
tion of markets which in terms of per capita income, population size and
degree of industrialization seem to offer a ^puch larger potential for
trade. Among these obstacles is the inertia of bureaucracies, the lack of
quality, the lack of foreign exchange, indebtedness, security consid-
erations (COCOM-List), and the diverging assessments between sellers
and buyers about future prices of goods to be bought back from the
socialist countries.
6. International Competitiveness and European Economic Integration
The establishment of the EC has, no doubt, created a host of new op-
portunities for export expansion and relocation of production facilities
which were swiftly exploited by European suppliers of manufactured
products. The step wise liberalization of trade among member countries,
the successive enlargement of the EC from six to now twelve members,
the harmonization of economic policies, the provision of financial
solidarity, and last but not least the European Monetary System (EMS)
have promoted economic integration, among EC member countries [ Lang-
hammer, 1987]. European companies have behaved perfectly rational when
they perceived the advantages of preferential access to a steadily ex-
panding European regional market and increasingly engaged in an intra-
industry division of labour among member countries and with the EFT A.103
The European market did not only provide scope for a rapid expansion
of direct exports, but - due to regional differentials in economic devel-
opment and the association of neighbouring, mostly developing countries
- also for a diversification of the geographical distribution of production
facilities under the common umbrella of the EC.
European economic integration has, however, a second side to it which
offers some bleak perspectives. Trade expansion among EC member coun-
tries took place in a regional market protected against unimpeded com-
petition from suppliers in other industrialized or developing countries.
Trade protection in its manifold forms and high growth of regional de-
mand stimulated by successive enlargements of the EC have provided an
economic environment in the past 25 years in which European industries
could flourish or at least survive even if they had already lost their
comparative cost advantages in Eur.ope (for details see, e.g., Donges et
al. [1982] or Wolf et al. [1984]).
The MFA, the European Steel Cartel, numerous national subsidy pro-
grams as well as informal national export self-restraint agreements for
Japanese automobiles are only a few examples of how export restrictions
for Japan or NICs have sustained scope for trade in manufactures among
EC countries and, thus, have allowed some industries with comparative
disadvantages vis-ji-vis suppliers from third countries to remain net ex-
porters. Without this substantial administrative support, parts of these
industries would have been relocated to other countries, in particular of
the Third World, much earlier, and there would have been more
resources in Europe for the emergence of new international competitive
industries. Delayed structural adjustment appears to be one of the major
reasons for the inferior performance of EC suppliers on ASEAN markets.
Another disquieting effect of the policy-induced regional orientation of
European companies results from the impact of trade protection and sub-
sidies on the dynamic behaviour of firms. A competitive edge over sup-
pliers from other countries may be achieved by a single major innova-
tion, but cannot be maintained without continuous improvements of prod-
ucts, production processes, marketing, organization, diversification of
locations, etc. The pressure to innovate is, however, reduced if compe-104
tition is diminished by trade barriers. Protected industries enjoy an arti-
ficial advantage over their competitors from abroad, and the lack of com-
petition supports an indifferent attitude towards increases of production
costs in these industries [ Leibenstein, 1978]. There is a tendency to
waste resources since managers rather seek to maintain the established
lines of production and markets than to be dynamic entrepreneurs, and
workers are less prepared to search for new and possibly even better
paid jobs in other companies or other industries. When the waste of re-
sources and slow productivity growth result in a creeping erosion of
competitiveness endangering the survival of firms, the answer usually is
not the required structural adjustment but rather demand for more pro-
tection. Hence, a cumulative process is set in motion which creates in-
centives to invest in lobby activities instead of productive capacity
(rent-seeking) and ultimately causes high economic costs for the whole
country in terms of foregone income growth and additional employment
opportunities which Tullock [1967] has already described 20 years ago.
These considerations highlight the dangers inherent in the "successful"
economic integration of EC member countries behind a protective shield
against competition from outside. Easy access to the regional market
renders exports to or investment in third countries less attractive and
inevitably impedes the necessary process of structural adjustment both in
traditional and in newly emerging export industries. Higher costs of pro-
duction in many sectors of the economy do, however, not only erode the
competitiveness of EC suppliers in overseas markets outside the EC such
as ASEAN, but will ultimately even endanger the market position of these
suppliers at home [Wolf, 1983, p. 18]. The changes of export market
shares presented in Chapter II bear witness that such an outcome is no
longer a threat but already a fact. EC losses of market shares are not
restricted to a few industries or far-off regions in which Japanese or US
competitors may have a special advantage, but extend - with few excep-
tions - across markets and industries while companies from Japan as well
as the US have in fact already succeeded in penetrating EC markets in a
wide range of products, albeit starting at a lower level than in other
markets. The competitive strength of overseas suppliers on EC markets
indicates that "fortress Europe" cannot be defended against superior
competitors by protectonist policies, at least not in the medium run.105
VII. Summary and Policy Conclusions
This study provides an analysis of the competition between European,
Japanese, and US companies in the relatively open and fast growing
ASEAN economies. The purpose of the analysis is to determine reasons
for the weak export performance of European suppliers in this region
over the last 15 years and to assess whether the declining competi-
tiveness of these suppliers in a not unimportant overseas market is
market-specific or rather symptomatic for a general tendency.
The evidence presented in the preceding chapters suggests a bit of
both. Many European companies have - other than their competitors in
Japan and the US - underestimated the growth potential of the ASEAN
region, and they have viewed these countries primarily as markets for
exports of final goods rather than participating on a broader basis in
the increasingly diversified economic potential of the region. The neglect
of South East Asia was, however, not merely incidental but had some
deeper roots which are related to the process of economic integration
taking place in Europe for more than 25 years. Economic integration in
Europe appears to have created - among other things - some artificial
competitive advantages for European companies in European markets
which threaten to gradually erode the international competitiveness of
manufacturing industries in Europe. For this reason, the lessons from
the ASEAN region deserve to be taken seriously.
In 1970-1984, the EC share in OECD exports to ASEAN countries
declined by 7 percentage points or 25 per cent while Japan lost 1.5 per-
centage points and the US gained roughly 2 percentage points (Table 2).
European losses of market shares were even larger in advanced in-
dustrial goods in which Europe is supposed to possess comparative cost
advantages. There are many determinants of a country's export perform-
ance in individual markets ranging from the distance between supplier
and destination over marketing strategies of individual companies to the
macroeconomic environment both in exporting and importing countries. In
the ASEAN case, geographical proximity may have been one of the roots
for the Japanese dominance in the region, but cannot explain the export106
performance in sophisticated manufactures over time as an analysis of
transport costs indicates. Looking at marketing strategies, European
companies have always tended to opt for the easier alternatives in
Southeast Asia compared to their overseas competitors: no representation
in the region rather than cooperation with local companies, reliance on
European agency houses rather than establishing marketing affiliates,
direct sales rather than investment abroad, and positioning of products
in the top-price, top-quality market segment rather than adapting them
in terms of product characteristics and pricing. This reluctance to com-
mit resources to the development of the markets under review accounted
for a major part of the competitive disadvantages of European companies
vis-a-vis their Japanese and US competitors in the ASEAN region.
Against this background, one may argue that the prospects of European
companies in the ASEAN economies are not entirely bleak. Redressing
marketing strategies in the sense of making greater marketing commit-
ments in the region should be easier to achieve than, e.g., reversing a
general decline of competitiveness. However, the major disadvantage of
European suppliers in Southeast Asia was their failure to exploit the
economic potential of the region through FDI. The EC share in FDI in
ASEAN countries was negligible and has not substantially risen in recent
years while Japan and the US continued to be the two leading investors
in the region. It was primarily their strong presence in the ASEAN
markets which provide Japanese and US companies with a competitive
edge over their European competitors. To recover lost ground in the
region will not be an easy task for European companies since their com-
petitors from other industrialized countries are so well established in all
ASEAN markets and the peak of the region's economic growth lies in the
past. Nonetheless - and this is the first lesson derived from our analysis
- there is scope for improving the European export performance in
ASEAN countries by reorganizing trade channels, adapting prices and
products, as well as by investing more in manufacturing subsidiaries.
FDI to penetrate protected foreign markets has proven to be the most
important single marketing strategy not only in Southeast Asia but
worldwide and across industries. FDI may reduce the potential for direct
exports but creates new demand for intermediate and capital goods not107
only by affiliated companies (intra-firm trade) but more generally be-
tween the home country of the foreign investor and the host country in
which investment takes place. The evidence on the positive relationship
between FDI and export expansion presented in the literature is clear-
cut, and the econometric analysis in Chapter IV has further strength-
ened the case. It shows, furthermore, that FDI is all the more important
for defending market shares when investors from other countries are
already engaged in the markets concerned such as in the ASEAN
economies.
A review of the scattered data on the geographical distribution of FDI
shows that European companies were generally more reluctant than,
e.g., their Japanese competitors to invest in developing countries, and
when they did so, their preferred locations were slowly-growing and
debt-ridden Latin American and African economies, but hardly Asia.
Furthermore, EC investment in ASEAN countries focussed on the tertiary
sector (banking and finance) which does not appear to be as export
stimulating as investment in manufacturing or mining, the main target of
Japanese and US firms in the region. This pattern of specialization in
developing countries revealed by European investors is hardly conducive
to sustain export expansion in the Third World, and the heavy Japanese
investment in Latin America in recent years (1) threatens to endanger
even well-entrenched traditional markets for European exports to
developing countries.
Since it is safe to assume that European companies are as keen as their
competitors to make use of profitable trade and investment opportunities,
the influence of the respective economic environment on company strate-
gies comes into focus. Macroeconomic trade, investment and labour
market policies differ among home countries of investors and, hence, may
promote, divert, or even discourage certain overseas activities of multi-
national companies based in these countries. The influence of host
country policies can be neglected as host countries do generally not dis-
criminate among multinationals by country of origin. An evaluation of in-
(1) In 1983-1985, registered Japanese FDI in Latin America amounted to
almost US $ 6 bill, compared to a bit over US $ 4 bill, in all of Asia
[MITI, c].108
vestment and export incentive policies applied in the EC, Japan, and the
US in fact reveals some distinctive features. Administrative support for
FDI has been larger in the case of Japan than in other industrialized
countries under review; it was more focussed on small and medium-sized
firms; and it had a clear regional bias in favour of Asian developing
countries. The policy-induced benefits for FDI in Asia have mostly ac-
crued from a combination of investment incentives and foreign aid poli-
cies in Japan.
The subsidisation of private investors is of course not a policy recipe to
be adopted by other industrialized countries. However, there is a lesson
to be learned from the Japanese experience. Successful penetration of
overseas markets may not only depend on the skills of a few big multi-
national corporations but also on the participation of small and medium-
sized firms in trade and FDI. Therefore, a second lesson emerging from
this study concerns the removal of obstacles preventing small and me-
dium-sized firms in Europe from engaging in trade and investment ac-
tivities in developing countries. Insufficient information on trade and in-
vestment opportunities may constitute one of these obstacles, but more
important are better access to domestic capital markets in home countries
for financing foreign activities of these firms.
The export success of US companies which have been granted even less
institutional support than their European competitors suggests, however,
that other influences need to be considered to explain the weak perfor-
mance of EC companies in Southeast Asia. Over the last 25 years, these
companies have greatly benefited from the progressing economic integra-
tion in Europe as is evident from close trade links between the EC
member countries; the EC and the EFT A together accounted for two
thirds of total EC exports in 1984. The liberalization of internal EC
trade, the free trade union with the EFTA, and two succession enlarge-
ments of the EC in conjunction with trade protection against suppliers
from third countries have provided large incentives for trade within the
EC and for direct exports rather than FDI as respective data show. The
export bias (i.e. exports of goods instead of capital) has detrimental
long-run effects in the international competitiveness of European com-
panies since it impedes the formation of human capital in terms of over-109
seas managerial expertise and perception as well as participation in
world-wide development trends. The scarcity of internationally ex-
perienced managers constituted a major obstacle to exports and foreign
investment of small and medium-sized firms and may have contributed to
the late discovery of Asia's economic growth potential in Europe.
Economic integration behind substantial trade barriers has generally
raised the profitability of production within the EC vis-a-vis production
in third countries. This investment-diverting effect has been further
aggravated by generous regional subsidies granted by the EC to
stimulate investment in backward regions of the Community; by preferen-
tial trading arrangements with Mediterranean countries which offer lo-
cation advantages similar to those in other developing countries, but
enjoy free access to EC markets; and by co-operation agreements with
East European socialist countries which provide an umbrella for outward
processing activities of EC companies. All those artificial incentives have
rendered investment in particular in developing countries less attractive
and explains at least partly the preference of European companies for
direct exports over direct investment in ASEAN countries.
The increasing orientation of European firms towards European markets
which shows up in trade and investment data presented in Chapter VI
nourishes some doubts with respect to the future competitiveness of
European manufacturing industries on world markets outside the EC. The
artificially reduced competition with major US and Japanese suppliers on
European markets is likely to slow down the innovative vigour of
European companies, to slacken productivity growth, and to promote
rent-seeking behaviour. These dangers are far from being merely hypo-
thetical as the substantial inroads of Japanese suppliers into EC markets
for many manufactured products underline. When the international
competitiveness declines it becomes increasingly difficult even to defend
the domestic markets against more advanced suppliers from other coun-
tries. In this sense European losses of export shares in ASEAN, EC and
world markets have to be viewed as writing on the wall which points at
the importance of dismantling artificial distortions of competition in
Europe as a prerequisite for the sustained international competitiveness
of European companies. This is a third lesson from this study.110
A fourth lesson concerns the recommendations made by the ASEAN-EC
High Level Working Party for promoting trade with and investment in
ASEAN countries. In a nutshell, this Working Party perceives a lack of
information as major bottleneck for business relationships with Southeast
Asia and recommends - among other things - the establishment of an
ASEAN Investment Data Bank and a so-called European business centre
in ASEAN capitals. The above reasoning clearly contradicts this assess-
ment, and there is also solid empirical evidence that a lack of information
does not distort company decisions. EC outward processing of textiles
and clothing was predominantly undertaken-in Mediterranean countries
because of preferential re-export facilities granted to these associated
countries. In electronics, however, where such preferences do not exist
the bulk of EC outward processing was carried out in ASEAN countries
and hardly any of these activities were attracted by Mediterranean coun-
tries. The example highlights once more the economic rationale of de-
cision making at the firm level. As soon as there are less incentives for
producing within the EC or in associated countries, firm-internal assess-
ment of alternative locations for foreign investment will change, too.
What matters is a removal of distortions, trade and otherwise, sheltering
European markets against outside competition, and this is an area for
which national governments and the EC Commission bear responsibility.Ill
Appendices
A. Measurement of Transport Cost Differentials
For each exporting country, the US, Japan, West Germany and the
largest individual EC supplier next to West Germany, first an average
import-weighted ad valorem rate of transport costs (T) is calculated:
100
where M. and Nf. are Philippine import values in the commodity i on a
cif and fob basis respectively. This rate reflects the level of transport
costs and allows for comparing the changes in transport costs for each
exporting country over time. However, due to different import weights it
does not yet allow for calculating transport cost differentials between
exporting countries.
Such differentials are derived in the next step in which an average im-
port-weighted deviation of transport costs in European and US exports
to the Philippines from the respective costs in the competing country's
exports is estimated, i.e., the relation between the cif/fob value ratios
(minus unity) in imports from different origins in identical items. For
the average commodity ratios a common weight, the value of imports from
Japan, is used in order to exclude a possible source of distortions.
Algebraically, the average import-weighted transport cost differential











R. and R., are cif/fob value ratios in Philippine imports of commodity i
13. ID
from country a and country b respectively, and M. . is the value of
imports from Japan in commodity i. The transport cost differential is
tested for its statistical significance in order to conclude on the extent
and stability of different transport costs in imports from different
sources of origin.
In a third step, for those product groups for which a statistically sig-
nificant deviation in the ratios from unity could be observed the average
cost advantage is calculated. This rate represents a preferential tariff
margin enjoyed by countries with lower transport costs.
B. Main Data Sources and Estimation Procedures for Intra-Firm Trade
US sources report intra-firm trade to be sufficiently disaggregated by
country and by industry for two benchmark years, 1977 and 1982 [U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, b]. The sample includes virtually all non-bank af-
filiates of non-bank US parents. Whereas trade statistics provide a
breakdown by commodity groups, regionally disaggregated intra-firm
trade was available only classified by industry of the affiliate. There-
fore, it was assumed that intra-firm trade with affiliates in any partic-
ular industry could be classified as belonging to the corresponding com-
modity group. This assumption proved also necessary for the other home
countries.
With respect to Japan, the largest investor in the non-petroleum sector
of ASEAN countries, intra-firm trade of Japanese affiliates can only be
derived from a sample survey on the activities of overseas affiliates
[MITI, a]. The most disaggregated geographical breakdown available in
this sample is "developing countries in Asia". Since only the sales and
purchase structures were recorded, the absolute volumes had to be re-
constructed using the overall exports and imports of the affiliates in any
region. To bring the estimates down to the ASEAN level, intra-firm ex-
ports were estimated for single ASEAN countries by assuming that within
Asia and within each manufacturing industry, intra-firm exports wereBibliothek
des Instituts fur Welfwirtschaft 113
distributed by country as was Japanese FDI in the respective industry
(see Ministry of Finance [var. years], for Japanese FDI).
The third home country publishing informations on intra-firm trade is
the U.K. [Dept. of Industry, var. years]. This source provides data on
related exports based on the analysis of returns from an overseas
transaction inquiry. The coverage of the sample survey is rather
complete, as the companies surveyed reported direct exports amounting
to more than 80 per cent of recorded UK exports. Most of the exports
not covered by the sample appear to be unrelated, as there are certainly
much more exporting UK enterprises with no overseas affiliates than
registered in the survey (609 in 1981).
From a sample of the world's largest enterprises [Dunning, Pearce,
1981; 1985], German intra-firm exports can be reconstructed. Sectorally
disaggregated sales data, export ratios and internal export ratios, based
on increasingly reduced samples, can be combined such as to arrive at
an estimate of intra-firm exports under the assumption of a homogenous
sample.114
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Source: World Bank [1986]; UN [b, May 1984]; own calculations.
Table A2 - Average Annual Growth Rates of Philippine Imports from the
US, Japan, West Germany and the World, 1970-1981
Total manufactures
Growth rate
Share in total imports moi
LyOL Chemicals
Growth rate





Share in total imports lggl
Machinery and transport equipment
Growth rate
Share in total imports .„„.
Miscellaneous manufactured articles
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Source: UN [a, 1970; 1981]; own calculations.115
Table A3 - Imports of Major Foreign-Affiliated Agency Houses (a) in
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(a) Excluding the Japanese sogo shosha and other Asian trading com-
panies. - (b) See von Kirchbach [1985, Table 3] for the list of com-
panies included in the survey. While the samples in the Republic of
Korea and Malaysia include the majority of the major agency houses, the
sample in Thailand includes all major agency houses. Figures include
commission business as well as business on own account.




















































































































Source: Japan Foreign Trade Council, unpublished data.117
Table A5 -Imports of 21 Affiliates of Japanese Trading Companies in the

























































Table A6 - Share of Small and Medium-Size (a) Firms in Japanese FDI


















ture, forestry, mining, manufacturing and
than ¥ 30 mill, in trade and
and servicing.
of less than ¥
of Share
(per












10 mill, in retail sale
Source: MITI [a, 1977].118



































































Source: UN [a, 1977]; own calculations.119
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data of individual companies.
(a) Excluding oil companies, banks and insurance companies. - (b) The
combined total of UK investment stocks including oil
insurance companies in Malaysia and Singapore were in 198]
mill.; in Thailand and Pakistan:
ing mining.











































D: suppressed to avoid
(a) Petroleum only. -
amounting to US $ 730










































































































19 (d) 261 (d) 281
disclosure of data of individual
- (b) In 1983 US $ 575
























































mill, out of total FDI
35 mill. - (d) Banking
Source: Data obtained from the Deutsche Bundesbank; Ministry of
Finance, Japan [1977; 1983]; Business Monitor [1981; 1984];
British Business [1984]; U.S. Dept. of Commerce [a, 1977;
1985; b]; unpublished data.123
Table A9 -Annual Growth Rate of FDI in ASEAN by Sector and Host























































































































































































































(a) Fiscal year; as reported
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(a) Excluding OPEC countries. - (b) Malaysia and Singapore only. - (c)
























































Source: See Table 18; own calculations.126















































































































































(a) Developing market economies of Asia
(b) Fiscal year 1976/77 (31st of March). -
panies, banks and insurance companies. -
(e) 1981, excluding oil companies, banks
































excluding Middle East. -
(c) 1974, excluding oil com-
(d) Fiscal year 1982/83. -
and insurance companies. -
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan [var. iss.]; U.S. Dept. of Commerce
[a]; U.K. Dept. of Industry [1977]; British Business [1984];
Deutsche Bundesbank [b], and unpublished data; own calcu-
lations .127
Table A12 -The Sectoral Distribution of FDI by Developing Regions,
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [a]; Ministry of Finance, Japan [var.
iss.]; U.S. Dept. of Commerce [a]; unpublished data and own
calculations.128
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